## Facts

- The parties cohabited beginning in 1995, married in 1999, and had twin daughters in 2004.
- The husband earned extraordinary income as a professional football player; the wife left paid employment after moving in with him.
- The husband filed for divorce in 2005; the parties agreed to joint legal custody, with the wife as primary residential custodian.
- After an 11-day trial, the Family Part entered a judgment of divorce and later an amended judgment addressing, among other matters, child support, disability insurance to secure support, and counsel/accountant fees.
- The trial court calculated guideline child support at approximately $36,000 per year, found an additional $200,000 per year in “supplemental need,” and ordered total child support of $214,745 per year, excluding certain expenses the husband agreed to pay separately.
- The trial court did not identify which claimed expenses it accepted as reasonable needs or make detailed findings supporting the supplemental amount.
- The trial court also required the husband to obtain a $7.5 million disability-insurance policy to secure future child support if he could no longer play.
- The trial court awarded the wife $13,777.50 in counsel and accountant fees despite a prenuptial provision stating each party would be responsible for their own fees and costs “both pending the litigation and upon completion of the actions.”
- On appeal, the parties stipulated to resolve and dismiss equitable-distribution issues, leaving child support, disability insurance, and counsel fees for review.

## Issues

1. Whether the supplemental child-support award was reversible error because it was not supported by specific findings on the children’s reasonable needs and the basis for deviation from guideline support.
2. Whether the record supported requiring the husband to obtain a $7.5 million disability-insurance policy as security for child support.
3. Whether awarding counsel and accountant fees to the wife was proper in light of the parties’ prenuptial fee provision and applicable family-part fee standards.

## Decision

- Reversed and remanded the supplemental child-support award because the trial court failed to make the specific factual findings necessary to justify the amount and explain which claimed expenses were reasonable needs.
- Reversed and remanded the disability-insurance requirement because the evidence and analysis were insufficient to support the $7.5 million coverage amount.
- Addressed counsel-fee issues through the lens of the prenuptial agreement’s fee-allocation clause, including its application to post-judgment proceedings such as reconsideration, and remanded to the extent further proceedings were required by the partial reversals.

## Legal Principles

- Child support is a shared parental obligation and must be based on the children’s reasonable needs, the parents’ economic circumstances and standard of living, and the children’s best interests.
- Children may share in a high-income parent’s standard of living, but support may not function as a vehicle for extravagance or overindulgence.
- Material deviations from guideline support, including large supplemental awards, require specific findings of fact and an articulated rationale tied to governing statutory factors and guideline considerations; the absence of such findings warrants reversal and remand.
- Courts may require insurance as security for support, but the amount and form of security must be supported by evidence and a reasoned calculation connected to the support obligation.
- A prenuptial fee-allocation clause may apply to proceedings pending and after judgment, including reconsideration, subject to the court’s authority under family-part fee rules in limited circumstances.

## Conclusion

The appellate court reversed and remanded because the trial court imposed a substantial supplemental child-support obligation and a $7.5 million disability-insurance requirement without the detailed findings and evidentiary basis needed for meaningful review, and it evaluated counsel-fee shifting in light of the parties’ prenuptial agreement and family-part fee standards.


Strahan v. Strahan, 953 A.2d 1219 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008)