## Facts

- James L. Strickland was insured under a life-accident policy issued by Gulf Life Insurance Company that provided benefits for loss of a leg by “dismemberment by severance” if the severance occurred within 90 days of an accidental injury.
- Strickland suffered an accidental injury to his right lower leg.
- Physicians attempted to save the leg; treatment continued for 118 days, after which the leg was amputated.
- Gulf Life denied benefits on the ground that the amputation occurred outside the policy’s 90-day severance condition.

## Issues

1. Whether a policy condition requiring dismemberment by severance within 90 days of injury may be unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
2. Whether summary judgment was proper where the insured pleaded that the 90-day severance condition was void on public-policy grounds.

## Decision

- The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming summary judgment for Gulf Life.
- The Court remanded for the trial court to consider Strickland’s pleadings and arguments that the 90-day severance condition is contrary to public policy.
- The Court did not hold the 90-day condition void on its face, but ruled it could not be enforced by summary judgment without addressing the public-policy challenge.

## Legal Principles

- Clear policy language defining the nature of a covered loss may be enforced as written, but a separate inquiry may exist when a policy imposes a strict temporal condition on an otherwise defined loss.
- A temporal condition on coverage may be subject to public-policy review when it may operate unreasonably in practice, including by pressuring medical decision-making about whether and when to amputate.
- Summary judgment is improper when the insured’s public-policy challenge to a temporal coverage condition requires consideration of reasonableness and related factual and policy considerations.

## Conclusion

The Georgia Supreme Court required further proceedings on whether a 90-day severance requirement in a dismemberment policy is void as against public policy, reversing summary judgment that had enforced the clause solely by its terms and remanding for evaluation of the insured’s challenge.


Strickland v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 240 Ga. 723, 242 S.E.2d 148 (1978)