## Facts

- Judith Nathanson, a Massachusetts family-law attorney, maintained a policy of representing only women in divorce matters.
- Joseph Stropnicky, a man seeking divorce representation, contacted Nathanson’s office and was told she did not represent men in divorce proceedings.
- Nathanson confirmed directly that she would not represent Stropnicky in his divorce because he was male and did not inquire into the merits of his case.
- Nathanson justified her women-only divorce practice as consistent with her values, responsive to perceived gender bias in family law, and beneficial to clients’ comfort and her perceived credibility.
- Stropnicky filed an administrative complaint alleging sex discrimination in a place of public accommodation under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 98.

## Issues

1. Whether a law office offering legal services to the public is a “place of public accommodation” under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 98, such that refusing divorce representation to men constitutes unlawful sex discrimination.
2. Whether the MCAD should decide the respondent attorney’s First Amendment defenses (speech and association) within the administrative adjudication.

## Decision

- The Hearing Commissioner found the law practice to be a place of public accommodation covered by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 98.
- The Commissioner held that refusing to consider a prospective divorce client solely because he is male is discrimination “on account of sex” prohibited by the statute.
- The Commissioner treated Nathanson’s policy-based and ideological reasons for sex-based client selection as not creating a statutory exception to the nondiscrimination rule.
- The Commissioner declined to rule on Nathanson’s First Amendment arguments, stating constitutional challenges were beyond the Commission’s authority.
- Relief ordered included a cease-and-desist directive and $5,000 in damages to Stropnicky.

## Legal Principles

- A law office that offers legal services to members of the public on a commercial basis may qualify as a place of public accommodation under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 98.
- A blanket refusal to provide a covered service to a prospective customer because of sex constitutes prohibited sex discrimination under the public-accommodations statute.
- An asserted ideological or policy rationale for sex-based client screening does not, absent a statutory exception, excuse otherwise prohibited discrimination under the statute as applied by the agency.
- An administrative agency may apply the governing antidiscrimination statute while declining to adjudicate constitutional defenses it concludes are reserved for judicial review.

## Conclusion

The MCAD Hearing Commissioner determined that an attorney who offers divorce services to the public may not categorically refuse to represent men in divorce matters because such a policy is sex discrimination in a place of public accommodation under Massachusetts law, ordered injunctive relief and damages, and left First Amendment objections for courts rather than the agency.


Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. 39 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination 1997)