## Facts

- Charles L. Stuckey (father) and Carol K. Stuckey (mother) were divorced; their minor son, Benjamin, was in the mother’s custody.
- The mother filed a verified motion in Jefferson County Court seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the father from contacting her or Benjamin.
- The mother alleged the father suffered from organic brain syndrome and that his threats and conduct caused fear for her and Benjamin’s safety, including a recent comment threatening Benjamin with physical violence.
- After an ex parte hearing at which the father did not appear, the county court issued a TRO restraining the father from contacting or approaching the mother or Benjamin under the Domestic Abuse Act.
- The county court set a show-cause hearing; at that hearing both parties appeared without counsel, the court heard evidence (including Benjamin’s testimony), and found the father was likely to cause harm unless restrained.
- The county court entered a permanent injunction barring the father from threatening, molesting, injuring, calling, or approaching the mother or Benjamin.

## Issues

1. Whether a county court has subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a permanent domestic-abuse injunction prohibiting a parent from any contact with a minor child.
2. Whether such an injunction is beyond county-court power because district courts have jurisdiction over custody and visitation matters.

## Decision

- The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, which had affirmed the county court’s permanent injunction.
- The Court held the county court had jurisdiction under the Domestic Abuse Act and the county court’s statutory authority to grant injunctive relief.
- The Court treated the order as a protective measure aimed at preventing domestic abuse, not as a custody or visitation adjudication.
- The Court noted the county court provided notice and a hearing before issuing the permanent injunction, consistent with injunction procedures.

## Legal Principles

- County courts may grant temporary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent domestic abuse when authorized by statute, including orders restraining contact to protect a child.
- A protective injunction that restricts parent-child contact does not become a custody or visitation determination merely because it affects access; the controlling purpose is prevention of threatened harm.
- District courts retain authority over custody and visitation adjudications, but that jurisdiction does not negate county-court authority to issue domestic-abuse injunctions directed to safety.
- Permanent injunctive relief requires notice and an opportunity to be heard; a show-cause hearing with evidentiary support can satisfy this requirement.

## Conclusion

The court upheld a county court’s authority to enter a permanent domestic-abuse injunction barring a parent from contacting a minor child, reasoning that such relief is a statutorily authorized protective order distinct from custody or visitation determinations reserved to district courts.


Stuckey v. Stuckey, 768 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1989)