## Facts

- Dr. Henry I. Stukuls was a tenure-track faculty member at a State University of New York college.
- An anonymous letter, received months earlier and never verified, accused Stukuls (a married man) of attempting to seduce a female student in his class.
- Dr. Whitney T. Corey, vice-president for academic affairs and acting president, read the letter’s contents to a five-member ad hoc faculty committee evaluating Stukuls’s tenure application.
- Stukuls was never shown the letter and was not given an opportunity to hear it read or respond.
- Stukuls alleged the communication harmed his reputation and contributed to denial of tenure.
- Stukuls sued the State in the Court of Claims for libel and slander based on Corey’s statements made in an official capacity.

## Issues

1. Whether a public university administrator’s communication of an unverified, anonymous accusation to a tenure committee is protected by absolute privilege in a defamation action.
2. Whether the communication is instead subject to qualified privilege, permitting liability upon proof of abuse (e.g., malice or reckless disregard).
3. Whether the claim could be dismissed at the pleading stage under CPLR 3211(a)(7) based on privilege.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and reinstated the claim.
- Absolute privilege did not bar the defamation claim arising from Corey’s reading of the anonymous letter to the tenure committee.
- The communication, if privileged at all, fell within a qualified privilege framework.
- Because qualified privilege can be lost through abuse and the pleadings did not conclusively negate that possibility, dismissal for failure to state a cause of action was improper.
- The matter was remitted for further proceedings, including discovery.

## Legal Principles

- Absolute privilege in defamation is narrowly confined to contexts where public policy requires complete immunity (commonly judicial, legislative, and certain high-level executive functions).
- Official status alone does not render internal personnel communications absolutely privileged.
- Communications among persons sharing a common interest in an employment-related decision are generally protected, if at all, by qualified privilege, which can be defeated by showing malice, bad faith, or reckless disregard for truth.
- On a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion, allegations are taken as true; the existence of a qualified privilege typically does not warrant dismissal unless the pleadings conclusively establish the privilege cannot be abused on the alleged facts.

## Conclusion

The court held that a SUNY administrator’s disclosure of an unverified anonymous accusation to a tenure committee was not absolutely privileged; at most it was qualifiedly privileged, so the defamation claim against the State could not be dismissed at the pleading stage and was reinstated for further proceedings.


Stukuls v. State, 42 N.Y.2d 272, 397 N.Y.S.2d 740, 366 N.E.2d 829 (N.Y. 1977)