## Facts

- John David Stumpf and Clyde Wesley entered Norman and Mary Jane Stout’s home in Ohio in May 1984 intending to commit robbery while armed with handguns.
- Stumpf held the Stouts at gunpoint while Wesley searched; Stumpf shot Mr. Stout twice in the head, and Mrs. Stout was shot and killed in another room.
- Stumpf confessed to the robbery and to shooting Mr. Stout but consistently denied shooting Mrs. Stout.
- Stumpf was indicted for aggravated murder and other offenses, with capital specifications; under Ohio law, aggravated murder required specific intent to kill.
- Stumpf waived a jury and pled guilty before a three-judge panel; Ohio procedure required an evidentiary hearing to establish a factual basis for the aggravated-murder plea.
- At the factual-basis hearing, the defense maintained Stumpf was not the shooter of Mrs. Stout; the prosecution argued Stumpf was the triggerman, and the panel adopted that theory and imposed a death sentence after finding insufficient mitigation.
- Months later, at Wesley’s separate trial, the same prosecution office presented a contrary account that Wesley shot Mrs. Stout, supported by witness testimony and ballistics evidence; Wesley received 20 years to life.
- After learning the evidence and theory used against Wesley, Stumpf sought to withdraw his guilty plea in state court; relief was denied.
- Stumpf filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court dismissed but granted a certificate of appealability, and Stumpf appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether Stumpf’s guilty plea to aggravated murder was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent where the record did not show he was adequately informed that specific intent to kill was an element.
2. Whether due process was violated when the State advanced mutually inconsistent theories in separate proceedings about who shot and killed Mrs. Stout, where that fact was central to the capital outcome.
3. Whether Stumpf received ineffective assistance of counsel at capital sentencing.
4. Whether Ohio’s death-penalty statute was unconstitutional as applied or on its face.

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of habeas relief.
- The court held Stumpf’s aggravated-murder guilty plea was constitutionally invalid because he was not properly informed of the specific-intent element.
- The court held due process was violated because the State used irreconcilable factual theories in Stumpf’s and Wesley’s cases regarding the identity of Mrs. Stout’s shooter, undermining the reliability of Stumpf’s conviction and death sentence.
- The court granted habeas relief setting aside the conviction and sentence, subject to further proceedings.
- A dissent would have denied relief, concluding the plea and the State’s litigation positions did not warrant habeas relief under applicable standards.

## Legal Principles

- A guilty plea is valid only if it is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; the record must show the defendant understood the nature of the charge, including essential elements.
- When a criminal statute requires specific intent, due process requires that a defendant who pleads guilty be informed, in substance, that the State must prove that mental state.
- Due process is violated when the prosecution secures convictions in separate proceedings by presenting mutually inconsistent factual accounts as true on a central issue, particularly where the disputed fact materially affects capital sentencing reliability.
- Federal habeas relief is warranted where constitutional errors render the conviction or sentence fundamentally unfair or unreliable.

## Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit granted habeas relief because Stumpf’s guilty plea to aggravated murder was not shown to be knowing and voluntary as to the offense’s specific-intent element, and because the State’s later presentation of an irreconcilable “Wesley-as-shooter” theory in a separate prosecution violated due process by undermining the factual reliability supporting Stumpf’s capital conviction and death sentence.


Stumpf v. Mitchell, 367 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2004)