Facts
- The claimant, a doctor, constructed a shed on his property adjacent to the defendant confectioner’s premises.
- The confectioner had produced confectionery using a pestle and mortar for more than twenty years prior to the shed’s construction.
- The doctor alleged that noise from the confectioner's activities substantially interfered with his ability to conduct his medical practice.
- The confectioner argued that, since the activity pre-dated the doctor’s shed, the doctor had “come to the nuisance” and was therefore not entitled to relief.
- The dispute concerned whether prior existence of the defendant’s activity provided a defence to a claim in private nuisance.
Issues
- Whether the prior, long-standing activity of the defendant confectioner constituted a defence to a private nuisance claim on the basis that the claimant “came to the nuisance.”
- Whether the nature of the locality affected whether the confectioner’s noise amounted to an actionable nuisance.
- What remedies were appropriate following a finding of nuisance.
Decision
- The Court of Appeal rejected the “coming to the nuisance” defence, finding that the prior existence of the confectioner's operations did not bar the doctor’s nuisance claim.
- The Court determined that no prescriptive right to commit a nuisance was acquired solely by long use, particularly when the activity had not constituted a nuisance until the claimant’s shed was built.
- The significance of locality was emphasised: reasonableness is judged in reference to the area’s character, and what is a nuisance in a residential area might not be so in an industrial one.
- An injunction was granted requiring the confectioner to cease using the pestle and mortar to prevent further disturbance to the doctor’s practice.
- The case confirmed that neither consent nor acquiescence could be attributed to the doctor, since he had no prior knowledge of the nuisance before constructing the shed.
Legal Principles
- The “coming to the nuisance” argument does not constitute a valid defence in private nuisance claims.
- The standard of nuisance is contextual; conduct may be a nuisance in one locality but not in another.
- Prescriptive rights to commit a nuisance cannot be acquired merely through prolonged prior use unless the activity was an actionable nuisance throughout.
- Relief for nuisance may include an injunction to prevent continuing interference; damages may be considered in light of later developments and policy.
- Landowners have a duty to prevent unreasonable and substantial interferences with their neighbour’s use or enjoyment of land, irrespective of whether the harm is from longstanding activities.
Conclusion
Sturges v Bridgman is a foundational case in private nuisance law, establishing that a defendant cannot rely on the “coming to the nuisance” defence and that whether an activity constitutes a nuisance depends on the nature of the locality and reasonableness of the interference, with remedies including injunctive relief where appropriate.
