Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852

Facts

• The claimant, a doctor, constructed a shed on his property adjacent to the defendant confectioner’s premises.
• The confectioner had produced confectionery using a pestle and mortar for more than twenty years prior to the shed’s construction.
• The doctor alleged that noise from the confectioner's activities substantially interfered with his ability to conduct his medical practice.
• The confectioner argued that, since the activity pre-dated the doctor’s shed, the doctor had “come to the nuisance” and was therefore not entitled to relief.
• The dispute concerned whether prior existence of the defendant’s activity provided a defence to a claim in private nuisance.

Issues

1. Whether the prior, long-standing activity of the defendant confectioner constituted a defence to a private nuisance claim on the basis that the claimant “came to the nuisance.”
2. Whether the nature of the locality affected whether the confectioner’s noise amounted to an actionable nuisance.
3. What remedies were appropriate following a finding of nuisance.

Decision

• The Court of Appeal rejected the “coming to the nuisance” defence, finding that the prior existence of the confectioner's operations did not bar the doctor’s nuisance claim.
• The Court determined that no prescriptive right to commit a nuisance was acquired solely by long use, particularly when the activity had not constituted a nuisance until the claimant’s shed was built.
• The significance of locality was emphasised: reasonableness is judged in reference to the area’s character, and what is a nuisance in a residential area might not be so in an industrial one.
• An injunction was granted requiring the confectioner to cease using the pestle and mortar to prevent further disturbance to the doctor’s practice.
• The case confirmed that neither consent nor acquiescence could be attributed to the doctor, since he had no prior knowledge of the nuisance before constructing the shed.

Legal Principles

• The “coming to the nuisance” argument does not constitute a valid defence in private nuisance claims.
• The standard of nuisance is contextual; conduct may be a nuisance in one locality but not in another.
• Prescriptive rights to commit a nuisance cannot be acquired merely through prolonged prior use unless the activity was an actionable nuisance throughout.
• Relief for nuisance may include an injunction to prevent continuing interference; damages may be considered in light of later developments and policy.
• Landowners have a duty to prevent unreasonable and substantial interferences with their neighbour’s use or enjoyment of land, irrespective of whether the harm is from longstanding activities.

Conclusion

Sturges v Bridgman is a foundational case in private nuisance law, establishing that a defendant cannot rely on the “coming to the nuisance” defence and that whether an activity constitutes a nuisance depends on the nature of the locality and reasonableness of the interference, with remedies including injunctive relief where appropriate.