## Facts

- Alfonso Suarez worked for Dickmont Plastics Corporation operating and cleaning plastic molding machinery.
- Suarez was injured while attempting to clear molten plastic from a molding machine that was still running; two fingers were partially amputated, causing permanent impairment.
- Suarez presented evidence that Dickmont required employees, over their objections, to clean the machine while it operated and did not allow shutdown as a safer method.
- Suarez presented evidence that Dickmont refused to install or use a protective cover/guard to prevent contact with dangerous parts during cleaning and operation.
- Suarez presented evidence that a foreman communicated Suarez would be fired if he did not clean the machine as directed.
- Suarez submitted an expert affidavit stating the practices violated accepted safety standards and that an injury like Suarez’s was foreseeable, predictable, and probable if the practices continued.
- Suarez sued in tort, alleging Dickmont intentionally created a working condition making serious injury substantially certain to occur, invoking the “intent to injure” exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Dickmont; the Appellate Court affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether the “intent to injure” exception to the Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Act permits a tort action when an employer intentionally maintains a dangerous condition knowing injury is substantially certain to occur, even without a specific desire to injure a particular employee.
2. Whether Suarez’s summary-judgment evidence created a genuine issue of material fact under the correct intent standard, precluding summary judgment.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court and set aside summary judgment for the employer.
- The court held the intent-to-injure exception includes two paths: (1) actual intent to injure and (2) intentional conduct creating or directing exposure to a dangerous condition with knowledge that injury is substantially certain.
- Applying that standard, the court held Suarez’s evidence (required cleaning of operating machinery, refusal of guards, threats of termination, and expert opinion on predictability of injury) was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- Workers’ compensation is generally the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries, but a narrow common-law exception allows tort claims when the employer intended to injure.
- “Intent to injure” may be shown by either:
  - a true intentional tort (actual intent to harm), or
  - intentional creation/maintenance of a dangerous condition, or intentional direction to perform a dangerous task, with knowledge that injury is substantially certain to occur.
- The substantial-certainty standard is strict; negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness do not suffice.
- On summary judgment, if the evidence could permit a reasonable inference that the employer knowingly subjected the employee to conditions where serious injury was substantially certain, the issue must be resolved by the trier of fact.

## Conclusion

The court held that workers’ compensation exclusivity does not bar an employee’s tort claim where the employer intentionally required work under dangerous conditions while knowing injury was substantially certain, and it ruled that Suarez presented enough evidence to proceed to a jury.


Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 639 A.2d 507 (Conn. 1994)