## Facts

- Elaine J. Subbe-Hirt worked as a salesperson for Prudential Insurance Company (Prudential).
- Robert Baccigalupi was Subbe-Hirt’s supervisor.
- Subbe-Hirt presented evidence that Baccigalupi routinely berated and demeaned her and other women in the office.
- The record included evidence that Baccigalupi used sexualized, degrading language (including referring to disciplining women employees as “trim her bush”).
- Subbe-Hirt also offered evidence that Baccigalupi conducted “root canals,” meaning episodes of sustained verbal abuse of disfavored employees until they cried, aimed at pushing them out of the company.
- Two sales managers testified that Baccigalupi regularly intimidated employees in an effort to get them out of the business.
- Baccigalupi repeatedly referenced “Joan of Arc” to Subbe-Hirt and asked her to resign.
- Subbe-Hirt was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) attributed to the workplace treatment.
- Subbe-Hirt gave Baccigalupi a doctor’s letter stating she should not be subjected to undue stress or work and asked that it be placed in her personnel file; Baccigalupi refused and said he did not see the letter and never wanted to see it again.
- Subbe-Hirt later blacked out while driving home from work, collided with the rear of a tractor-trailer, and was hospitalized for eight days.
- She took temporary disability leave and alleged she remained totally disabled due to PTSD.
- Subbe-Hirt sued Prudential and Baccigalupi, including a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) under New Jersey law.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the IIED claim, concluding it was barred by the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) and, alternatively, that the conduct was not sufficiently extreme and outrageous.

## Issues

1. Whether Subbe-Hirt’s IIED claim was barred by the WCA’s exclusive-remedy provision, or whether the alleged conduct could qualify as an “intentional wrong” under New Jersey law.
2. Whether, on the summary judgment record, a reasonable jury could find the elements of IIED—especially extreme and outrageous conduct, intent or reckless disregard, causation, and severe emotional distress.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment on the IIED claim and remanded.
- The court held the district court applied the wrong intent analysis for the WCA “intentional wrong” exception by treating “substantial certainty” as the only route to intent, rather than applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A definition recognized in Millison.
- Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Subbe-Hirt, the court concluded a reasonable jury could find that defendants’ conduct met the “intentional wrong” threshold and could also satisfy New Jersey’s IIED standard, making summary judgment improper.

## Legal Principles

- New Jersey’s WCA generally provides the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries against an employer, but does not bar claims for an “intentional wrong.”
- Under Millison, “intent” tracks Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A: the actor intends the consequences if the actor (a) desires to cause them, or (b) knows they are substantially certain to result.
- A court errs by treating “substantial certainty” as the sole measure of intent and ignoring the alternative “desire to cause consequences” route under § 8A.
- Under New Jersey law (as described in Buckley and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46), IIED requires: (1) intentional or reckless conduct, (2) extreme and outrageous conduct, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress.
- At summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party; where the record supports competing inferences about intent, outrageousness, and severity, those questions generally belong to the jury.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit reinstated Subbe-Hirt’s IIED claim and remanded, holding that the district court’s WCA exclusivity ruling rested on an incorrect intent standard and that the record evidence—of deliberate, degrading verbal abuse aimed at driving employees out, refusal to accept medical restrictions, and severe resulting harm—could allow a reasonable jury to find both an “intentional wrong” and conduct extreme enough to support IIED under New Jersey law.


Subbe-Hirt v. Baccigalupi, 94 F.3d 111 (1996)