## Facts

- Harold and Carla Sullivan, an African-American couple, met with Jan Hernandez, a leasing agent for Noah & Cummings Property Management, Inc., on December 31, 1998 to discuss and view rental properties.
- Hernandez showed the Sullivans several homes, including a single-family house at 503 Curry Ford Road owned by Ronald and Maureen Carroll.
- After viewing 503 Curry Ford Road, the Sullivans completed a rental application for the property on December 31, 1998.
- Hernandez delivered the application to Susan Ronan, the listing agent for the Carrolls’ property, affiliated with Long & Foster Real Estate, Inc.
- Ronan asserted that she did not receive the Sullivans’ application until January 4, 1999.
- A few days before Ronan allegedly received the Sullivans’ application, she received an application from another prospective tenant, Partha Bagchi.
- Background information was obtained on both applicants, including credit reports, rental history, and employment information.
- The reports indicated: (1) Bagchi’s salary was about $90,000; (2) the Sullivans’ combined salary was about $50,000; (3) the Sullivans had about $27,000 in reserves; (4) Mrs. Sullivan had two negative credit reports and one prior bankruptcy; and (5) Bagchi had once violated a prior lease by vacating more than a month before the lease ended.
- The Carrolls decided to rent the property to Bagchi, stating that the decision was based on Bagchi’s stronger financial profile.
- The Sullivans sued Hernandez and others involved in the rental process, asserting race discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and also asserting FHA disability discrimination tied to the Sullivans’ financial history.
- After discovery, defendants (and the Carrolls, brought into the case as third-party defendants) moved for summary judgment, and the Sullivans filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on their disability-discrimination claims.

## Issues

1. Whether, under the FHA and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the evidentiary record on the refusal to rent to the Sullivans and the decision to rent to Bagchi raised genuine disputes of material fact about racial discrimination, so that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment.
2. Whether the Sullivans were entitled to summary judgment on their FHA disability-discrimination claims based on the theory that defendants rejected them because disability-related financial problems appeared in their credit history.

## Decision

- The court denied defendants’ (and the Carrolls’) joint motion for summary judgment.
- The court denied the Sullivans’ cross-motion for summary judgment on the FHA disability-discrimination claims.
- On the race-discrimination claims, the court held that the record—viewed under the summary-judgment standard—contained disputes of material fact about the application timing, the handling of the applications, and whether the stated financial rationale could be found to be a pretext for race discrimination.
- On the disability-discrimination claims, the court held that the Sullivans had not shown—on undisputed facts—that they qualified as disabled under the FHA and that the rental decision was made because of disability rather than because of credit and bankruptcy concerns.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment is improper when material facts are genuinely disputed or when the outcome depends on credibility determinations and competing inferences about intent.
- FHA and § 1981 intentional-discrimination claims may be evaluated using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach: (1) prima facie case; (2) defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; (3) plaintiff’s showing that the stated reason is a pretext for discrimination.
- In a rental case, the prima facie requirement that the housing opportunity remained available can be satisfied where the evidence would allow a factfinder to conclude the dwelling was still open to the plaintiff when the application was received, even if another application was pending or later accepted.
- Comparative financial qualifications (income, savings, credit history) can be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for selecting one applicant over another, but inconsistent accounts about timing, decision-making, and communications can support an inference that the stated reason was not the real reason.
- An FHA disability-discrimination claim requires evidence of a qualifying disability and evidence that the challenged housing decision was made because of that disability; reliance on neutral screening criteria such as credit history, without a supported causal link to disability-based treatment, does not establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

## Conclusion

In *Sullivan v. Hernandez*, the District of Maryland denied summary judgment to all parties because the record contained triable fact disputes on the Sullivans’ FHA and § 1981 race-discrimination claims, including disputes bearing on whether the asserted financial justification for choosing a different applicant masked racial bias, while also denying the Sullivans’ effort to win as a matter of law on disability discrimination because the evidence did not conclusively show FHA-covered disability status or that the rental decision was made because of disability rather than credit and bankruptcy concerns.


Sullivan v. Hernandez, 215 F. Supp. 2d 635 (2002)