Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009)

Facts

  • Congress enacted the Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act (ARA), requiring notice, comment, and an administrative appeal process for certain Forest Service projects.
  • The U.S. Forest Service adopted regulations categorically excluding certain small projects, including some salvage timber sales, from those procedures.
  • After a fire in the Sequoia National Forest, the Forest Service approved the Burnt Ridge Project, a 238-acre salvage timber sale, under a categorical exclusion and without notice, comment, or an administrative appeal.
  • Environmental organizations sued to stop the Burnt Ridge Project and also brought facial challenges to Forest Service regulations exempting small projects from notice, comment, and appeals.
  • The district court preliminarily enjoined the Burnt Ridge sale; the parties then settled the Burnt Ridge-specific claims and the project was withdrawn.
  • Despite the settlement, the district court adjudicated the facial challenges, invalidated certain regulations, and issued a nationwide injunction.
  • The Ninth Circuit affirmed invalidation of the regulations applied to Burnt Ridge but held challenges to other regulations not involved in Burnt Ridge were not ripe.

Issues

  1. Whether environmental organizations had Article III standing to maintain a facial challenge to Forest Service procedural regulations after the Burnt Ridge Project dispute was settled and withdrawn.
  2. Whether an alleged deprivation of statutory procedural rights, without a concrete affected interest, constitutes injury in fact.
  3. Whether probabilistic or “statistical likelihood” of future harm to members is sufficient to show an actual or imminent injury.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court held, 5–4, that respondents lacked Article III standing once the Burnt Ridge controversy was resolved.
  • The Court ruled that respondents identified no concrete, particularized, and imminent injury to any member from any live or threatened application of the challenged regulations.
  • The Court rejected reliance on generalized environmental harm and on statistical likelihood that some members might be affected in the future.
  • The Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
  • Article III requires a plaintiff to show an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.
  • Organizational plaintiffs may sue based on members’ injuries, including aesthetic or recreational harms, but not based on generalized interest in lawful government conduct or environmental protection.
  • “The deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation” is insufficient to establish standing; a procedural violation must be tied to a concrete, imminent impact on the plaintiff.
  • Assertions that it is “statistically likely” that members will encounter agency action governed by a challenged rule do not satisfy the imminence requirement without specific plans or a specific threatened application.
  • Broad challenges to agency regulations, divorced from a live dispute involving a concrete application, generally do not present a justiciable case or controversy.

Conclusion

Because the only identified project providing a concrete application of the challenged regulations was settled and withdrawn, the environmental organizations could not show an actual or imminent, member-specific injury; the Supreme Court therefore vacated and ordered dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.