## Facts

- William Otis Garland’s will created the “Richard David Garland Trust,” funded with a $100,000 certificate of deposit, with a bank serving as trustee.
- The trust provided that Richard David Garland could use the interest generated by the trust property until he reached age thirty.
- The trust further provided that if Richard Garland died or was convicted of a felony before turning thirty, the trust corpus would be divided equally between Donna Garland Summers and Ruby Jo Garland Warren.
- On December 3, 1993, before his thirtieth birthday, Garland pleaded guilty to a class C felony in Johnson County Circuit Court.
- The circuit court placed Garland on probation for five years and ordered him to pay a $1,000 fine and court costs.
- Garland turned thirty on August 9, 2000. On August 16, 2000, he petitioned the circuit court to dismiss the felony charge and seal the related records based on his completion of probation.
- On August 23, 2000, the circuit court found Garland had complied with probation, dismissed the felony offense, and sealed the records.
- After the dismissal and sealing, both Garland and Summers demanded the trust property from the trustee.
- The trustee filed an interpleader action in Pope County Chancery Court to determine entitlement to the trust corpus.
- Garland moved for summary judgment, arguing he was not “convicted” because the charge was dismissed and the record sealed, and that the sealed documents could not be introduced.
- The chancery court granted summary judgment for Garland, concluding that Summers could not present evidence of a conviction because the felony charge had been dismissed.

## Issues

1. Whether Garland’s guilty plea and sentence (including probation and a fine) constituted being “convicted of a felony” under the trust’s condition, despite the later dismissal and sealing of the criminal case.
2. Whether the sealing and dismissal order barred Summers from offering evidence of the prior plea and sentence in the trust litigation.
3. Whether the chancery court properly granted summary judgment to Garland on the ground that he was not “convicted” for purposes of the trust.

## Decision

- The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded.
- The court held that Garland’s guilty plea followed by the court’s imposition of punishment (probation, a fine, and costs) constituted a felony conviction for purposes of the trust provision.
- The court rejected the argument that the later dismissal and sealing of the criminal case meant Garland had never been convicted for purposes of determining rights under a private trust.
- The court held that the sealing/expungement statutes did not preclude Summers from using evidence of the plea and sentence to prove whether the trust condition was satisfied.
- Because the chancery court’s legal conclusions about “conviction” and the effect of sealing were incorrect, summary judgment for Garland was improper.

## Legal Principles

- A guilty plea coupled with the imposition of a sentence or punishment (including probation and a fine) constitutes a “conviction” when a private instrument makes consequences turn on whether a person has been convicted of a felony.
- A later order dismissing a charge and sealing records after successful completion of probation does not retroactively change the fact that the person previously pleaded guilty and was sentenced; it does not negate private rights triggered by the earlier conviction unless the governing instrument provides otherwise.
- Statutes permitting sealing or expungement are aimed at limiting public access and relieving certain legal disabilities; they do not bar all uses of the sealed record in related civil litigation when the fact of the prior adjudication is material.
- Summary judgment is improper when it rests on an incorrect rule of law concerning the legal effect of undisputed events (here, the plea, sentencing, and later sealing) on the parties’ rights under the trust.

## Conclusion

The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded because Garland’s 1993 guilty plea and resulting punishment constituted a felony conviction under the trust’s “convicted of a felony” condition, and the later dismissal and sealing of his criminal case did not prevent Summers from proving the conviction or support summary judgment awarding the trust corpus to Garland.


Summers v. Garland, 98 S.W.3d 23 (2003)