## Facts

- Manickavasagam Suresh, a Sri Lankan Tamil, entered Canada in 1990 and was recognized as a Convention refugee in 1991.
- While his permanent residence application was pending, Canadian authorities detained him in 1995 and began deportation proceedings on national security grounds.
- A security assessment alleged Suresh was a member and fundraiser for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), described as a terrorist organization.
- Under former Immigration Act s. 53(1)(b), the Minister formed the opinion that Suresh was a “danger to the security of Canada” and could be removed despite Suresh’s claim he faced a risk of torture if returned to Sri Lanka.
- Suresh could make written submissions, but he was not given key adverse material (including an immigration/security memorandum) relied on by the Minister and therefore could not meaningfully answer it.
- The Federal Court (Trial Division) and Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision and the statutory scheme; Suresh appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether deporting a Convention refugee to a country where there is a substantial risk of torture violates Charter s. 7, including where the torture would be inflicted abroad.
2. Whether the statutory terms “danger to the security of Canada” and “terrorism” are unconstitutionally vague under Charter s. 7.
3. Whether removal based on alleged membership in or support for a terrorist organization infringes freedoms of expression or association (Charter ss. 2(b) and 2(d)).
4. Whether the procedures used to reach the Minister’s danger opinion and removal decision satisfied Charter s. 7 requirements of fundamental justice, including disclosure and an opportunity to respond.
5. What standard of review applies to the Minister’s determinations regarding security danger and risk of torture.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously allowed the appeal in part.
- The Court held Charter s. 7 can apply where Canadian deportation action is sufficiently connected to a risk of torture abroad.
- Deportation to face a substantial risk of torture generally violates Charter s. 7; only a narrow, exceptional possibility was left open for “extraordinary circumstances” tied to overriding security concerns.
- The Court rejected the vagueness challenges and upheld the facial constitutionality of the challenged security-removal provisions.
- The Court found the process used against Suresh did not meet the requirements of fundamental justice because he lacked sufficient disclosure and a meaningful chance to respond to key adverse material.
- The Minister’s decision was set aside and the matter was returned for reconsideration under constitutionally adequate procedures.

## Legal Principles

- Charter s. 7 protects against state action that would expose a person to a substantial risk of torture through deportation, when there is a sufficient causal connection between Canadian action and the foreign harm.
- As a general rule, deporting a refugee to a substantial risk of torture is contrary to fundamental justice; any permissible exception would require an exceptionally high justification and would be rare.
- Statutory language in security contexts is not void for vagueness if it provides fair notice and a workable core meaning; “danger to the security of Canada” and “terrorism,” read in context, meet that standard.
- Where removal engages a serious risk such as torture, fundamental justice requires heightened procedural protections, including meaningful notice of the case, disclosure of the substance of adverse information subject to legitimate confidentiality limits, and a real opportunity to respond.
- Constitutional and pure legal questions attract correctness review; fact-intensive and discretionary ministerial assessments (including security danger and torture risk) are reviewed for reasonableness.

## Conclusion

The Court held that Canada generally cannot deport a refugee to a substantial risk of torture consistent with Charter s. 7, upheld the facial validity of the security-removal provisions, and required stronger procedural fairness—especially disclosure and a meaningful opportunity to respond—before a security-based removal decision can stand.


Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can. 2002)