## Facts

- Herman W. Swenson applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits, alleging disability starting October 16, 1979, after he stopped working due to arteriosclerotic heart disease and severe fatigue.
- After a February 1982 hearing, an ALJ found Swenson had a seventh-grade education, semiskilled work experience, and exertional and non-exertional limitations, but concluded he could perform routine, low-stress, unskilled work.
- A vocational expert testified that Swenson could perform “hundreds” of jobs nationally and “several thousand” jobs in his state, yet also stated Swenson could perform fewer jobs than a hypothetical 58-year-old who would be deemed disabled under the Medical–Vocational Guidelines.
- In a prior appeal, the case was remanded; on remand the agency found Swenson disabled as of April 13, 1983 (his 55th birthday), but not disabled from October 16, 1979 through April 12, 1983, despite finding no material change in his condition between 1982 and 1985.
- Swenson’s widow sought review of the denial for the disputed period; the district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary.

## Issues

1. Whether the agency committed legal error by failing to state adequate reasons for rejecting Swenson’s subjective testimony of disabling fatigue.
2. Whether the agency failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for discounting treating and examining medical opinions supporting disability during the disputed period.
3. Whether the agency improperly relied on vocational expert testimony that was internally inconsistent and inconsistent with the Medical–Vocational Guidelines without resolving the conflict.
4. Whether selecting the 55th-birthday onset date reflected an improper mechanical use of the Medical–Vocational Guidelines where the record showed no material change in condition.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment.
- The court held the agency erred by not articulating specific reasons for discrediting Swenson’s symptom testimony about disabling fatigue.
- The court held the agency erred by accepting vocational testimony inconsistent with the Medical–Vocational Guidelines without explaining the inconsistency.
- The court ordered remand for payment of benefits for October 16, 1979 through April 13, 1983, concluding the record was sufficiently developed and that disability was established if improperly rejected evidence were credited.

## Legal Principles

- When a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony is supported by medical evidence and there is no evidence of malingering, the adjudicator must provide specific, clear reasons for rejecting the testimony.
- Treating and examining source opinions may not be rejected without specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence.
- The Medical–Vocational Guidelines may not be applied mechanically where non-exertional limitations materially affect the occupational base; vocational expert evidence must be reconciled with the Guidelines’ framework, and conflicts must be addressed on the record.
- If the agency fails to give legally adequate reasons for rejecting evidence and the record is fully developed such that crediting the rejected evidence requires a finding of disability, the proper remedy may be remand for an award of benefits rather than further proceedings.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit required payment of disability benefits for the disputed pre-55 period because the agency did not adequately justify rejecting Swenson’s fatigue testimony and supportive medical opinions, and it relied on unresolved inconsistencies between vocational testimony and the Medical–Vocational Guidelines while effectively setting onset by mechanical age-category reasoning.


Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1989)