## Facts

- Karla Dunston and Jacob Szafranski, then in a romantic relationship, created three cryopreserved pre-embryos using Dunston’s ova and Szafranski’s sperm at a hospital fertility program.
- In March 2010, Dunston was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and advised that chemotherapy would likely cause infertility; she requested Szafranski’s sperm donation to create pre-embryos, and he agreed.
- The parties signed an “Informed Consent for Assisted Reproduction” form stating that no use could be made of the embryos without the consent of both partners.
- After Dunston began chemotherapy, Szafranski ended the relationship approximately one month later.
- The parties consulted counsel and discussed a proposed co-parent agreement under which Dunston would control the embryos if the relationship ended, but no written co-parent agreement was executed.
- Szafranski sued for an injunction to prevent Dunston from using the pre-embryos, asserting an interest in avoiding genetic parenthood.
- Dunston counterclaimed for sole custody and control to use the pre-embryos to attempt pregnancy.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by resolving the embryo-disposition dispute through a pure balancing-of-interests approach rather than first determining whether an enforceable agreement governed disposition.
2. Whether Szafranski’s constitutional privacy and liberty interests required his contemporaneous consent for any future use, operating as a categorical bar to Dunston’s use.
3. Whether genuine issues of material fact existed regarding an oral or written agreement about disposition, making summary judgment improper.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment for Dunston and the denial of Szafranski’s cross-motion, and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held that Illinois should apply a hybrid framework: courts must first honor any valid prior agreement on disposition; only if no controlling agreement exists should courts balance the parties’ competing interests.
- The court concluded summary judgment was improper because factual disputes remained as to whether the parties had an enforceable agreement (oral and/or written) and how any such agreement related to the informed-consent form.

## Legal Principles

- Disputes over cryopreserved pre-embryos should be resolved by (1) enforcing any advance disposition agreement between the parties, so long as enforcement does not violate public policy, and (2) if no enforceable agreement controls, balancing the parties’ interests in procreation and in avoiding procreation.
- Pre-embryos are neither equivalent to born children nor mere property; they warrant special respect due to their potential for human life, but their disposition is governed by agreement and, failing that, judicial balancing.
- An individual’s interest in avoiding procreation is a significant liberty interest but is not an automatic veto that nullifies prior agreements or categorically controls the outcome; it is considered within the agreement analysis and, if necessary, the balancing analysis.
- Where material facts are disputed regarding the existence, terms, or enforceability of a disposition agreement—including the intended legal effect of clinic consent forms—summary judgment is inappropriate.

## Conclusion

The court required a contract-first, balancing-second method for resolving frozen pre-embryo disposition disputes and reversed summary judgment because unresolved factual questions remained about whether the parties reached a binding disposition agreement and how it interacted with the clinic’s consent documentation.


Szafranski v. Dunston, 2013 IL App (1st) 122975, 993 N.E.2d 502 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)