## Facts

- Robert S. Maine, a Navy servicemember stationed in Guam, finished a 24-hour duty shift and went on liberty on April 13, 1985.
- Maine spent much of the day and evening drinking at multiple on-base locations and appeared intoxicated when he returned to his barracks around 11:00 p.m.
- Shortly thereafter, Maine drove his personal vehicle off base to get food and collided with a vehicle in which Scott A. Taber, also a servicemember on liberty, was riding.
- Taber suffered severe injuries; neither Taber nor Maine was performing a specific military task at the time of the accident.
- Taber sued Maine and the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging the United States was vicariously liable because Maine acted within the scope of employment (“in the line of duty”).

## Issues

1. Whether, under Guam respondeat superior law (as informed by California law), Maine’s on-base drinking and subsequent off-base driving while on liberty could be found within the FTCA “line of duty,” permitting vicarious liability against the United States.
2. Whether the Feres doctrine barred Taber’s FTCA suit because his injuries were “incident to military service.”

## Decision

- The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the United States and remanded.
- The court held a factfinder could conclude Maine acted within the scope of employment under applicable respondeat superior principles; off-duty and off-base status did not defeat scope as a matter of law.
- The court held Feres did not bar the claim because Taber’s injury occurred during personal liberty activity with insufficient connection to military mission, orders, or discipline to trigger the doctrine.

## Legal Principles

- Under the FTCA, a servicemember acts “in the line of duty” when the conduct falls within the “scope of employment” under the respondeat superior law of the place of the tort.
- When local law is uncertain, courts may look to persuasive authorities used by that jurisdiction; here, California’s broad respondeat superior approach informed Guam law.
- Respondeat superior may extend to risks that are foreseeable and characteristic of the employer’s enterprise, including conduct connected to employer-provided or tolerated on-premises drinking and its predictable consequences.
- Summary judgment is improper where reasonable factfinders could differ on whether enterprise-related conditions and customary incidents of employment make the injury-producing conduct within scope.
- Feres bars FTCA suits only for injuries sufficiently tied to military service such that adjudication would implicate military discipline, command decisions, or service-related activity; off-duty personal activity may fall outside Feres.

## Conclusion

The court held the United States was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because a factfinder could reasonably treat on-base drinking during liberty and the ensuing off-base driving accident as within scope of employment under applicable respondeat superior doctrine, and because Taber’s off-duty injury was not “incident to service” for purposes of Feres.


Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1995)