## Facts

- Thomas J. Tacket, a supervisory employee at Delco Remy’s Anderson, Indiana plant, was blamed by some union employees for diverting bargaining-unit work.
- A stenciled sign appeared inside the plant stating: “TACKET TACKET WHAT A RACKET.”
- A larger version appeared briefly and was removed; the smaller sign remained visible on an interior wall for roughly seven to eight months.
- Tacket asserted the phrase implied dishonesty and corrupt conduct and harmed his reputation in the labor-relations context.
- Tacket alleged Delco “published” the statement by creating, ratifying, or permitting the sign to remain posted where employees and supervisors would see it.
- Delco investigated allegations of anti-union conduct and found insufficient evidence; Tacket was later transferred.
- Tacket developed psychological symptoms diagnosed as depressive neurosis, which he attributed to the sign and the resulting workplace reaction.

## Issues

1. Whether “TACKET TACKET WHAT A RACKET” was defamatory *per se* under Indiana law or, because it required extrinsic context, actionable only as defamation *per quod*.
2. If the claim was *per quod*, whether Tacket pleaded and proved “special damages” as Indiana law requires (i.e., specific pecuniary loss).
3. Whether a post-trial amendment alleging psychological injury could satisfy Indiana’s special-damages requirement and sustain the jury’s award.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment for Tacket and ordered judgment entered for Delco.
- The court treated the claim as defamation *per quod* because the words were ambiguous and the jury found the phrase not defamatory “by itself.”
- The court held Tacket did not prove the required special damages because he showed no concrete pecuniary loss.
- The court held the post-trial amendment did not cure the defect because emotional or psychological injury is not the type of “special damages” required for *per quod* defamation under Indiana law.

## Legal Principles

- Under Indiana law, a statement is defamatory *per se* only if, on its face and without extrinsic facts, it falls within recognized categories such as imputing crime or professional misconduct.
- When defamatory meaning depends on surrounding circumstances, the claim is defamation *per quod* and the plaintiff must plead and prove special damages with particularity.
- In Indiana *per quod* defamation, special damages require proof of actual pecuniary loss proximately caused by the publication; emotional or psychological injury alone is insufficient.
- Federal procedural rules permitting amendment to conform to the evidence do not alter substantive state-law requirements governing the nature of recoverable damages.

## Conclusion

The court vacated a $100,000 jury verdict because the workplace slogan was not defamatory on its face and, as a *per quod* claim, required proof of specific economic harm; psychological injury without demonstrated pecuniary loss could not support liability or damages under Indiana defamation law.


Tacket v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 937 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1991)