## Facts

- California and Nevada created the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) through an interstate compact to manage land use and protect environmental quality in the Lake Tahoe Basin.
- Concerned that rapid development threatened the lake’s clarity and ecosystem, TRPA adopted temporary development moratoria while preparing a comprehensive regional plan.
- TRPA enacted two successive measures: Ordinance 81-5 (Aug. 24, 1981–Aug. 26, 1983) and Resolution 83-21 (Aug. 27, 1983–Apr. 25, 1984), together restricting most development for about 32 months on substantial areas within TRPA’s jurisdiction.
- Property owners and their association alleged the moratoria eliminated all economically viable use of their land during the moratorium period.
- Petitioners sought just compensation under the Takings Clause, asserting the temporary total deprivation should be treated as a categorical taking.

## Issues

1. Whether a temporary development moratorium adopted while preparing a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a per se taking requiring compensation under the Takings Clause.
2. Whether the “parcel as a whole” inquiry permits isolating a temporal segment of ownership to trigger a categorical rule for total deprivation of use.
3. Whether claims based on temporary restrictions should be analyzed under Lucas’s categorical rule or Penn Central’s case-specific framework.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment rejecting a per se taking, holding (6–3) that the temporary moratoria were not categorical takings requiring compensation.
- The Court declined to treat the 32-month period as a separate property interest, applying the “parcel as a whole” concept across both space and time.
- The Court held that temporary restrictions on development, even if they deny all use for a time, must be evaluated under Penn Central’s ad hoc inquiry rather than Lucas’s categorical rule.
- The Court read First English as addressing remedy (compensation when a temporary taking is found), not as establishing that temporary moratoria automatically constitute takings.
- The Court emphasized the decision was limited to rejecting a categorical rule for these moratoria and did not resolve any as-applied Penn Central claim.

## Legal Principles

- Lucas’s per se rule is limited to the relatively rare circumstance where regulation permanently eliminates all economically beneficial use of the property.
- For temporary development restrictions, the relevant property interest is the parcel as a whole, including its temporal dimension; courts generally may not create a per se taking by conceptually severing a “time slice” of ownership.
- Temporary moratoria are not immune from takings scrutiny, but whether they effect a taking is determined by Penn Central’s factors, including economic impact, interference with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action.
- First English establishes that compensation may be an available remedy for temporary takings once a taking is shown, but it does not define when a temporary regulation constitutes a taking.

## Conclusion

The Court held that a temporary planning moratorium adopted to allow formulation of a comprehensive land-use plan is not a per se taking merely because it temporarily denies all economic use; instead, any takings claim must be assessed under Penn Central’s fact-specific framework, considering the parcel as a whole over time.


Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)