## Facts

- Tara M., a minor, suffered severe abuse while in out-of-home placements arranged through Philadelphia’s child-welfare authorities and related organizations.
- Nancy Kanter, an attorney, was appointed by a state court as Tara’s guardian ad litem and guardian of her estate.
- Tara’s mother, then a teenager in placement care, was found to be abusive toward Tara; Tara was moved to a different placement.
- Years later, Tara was sexually abused in one placement home and later physically tortured in another.
- Kanter, acting for Tara, sued the City of Philadelphia and multiple agencies and individuals involved in Tara’s care (collectively, the city defendants), alleging a substantive due process violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state-law claims (including negligence and failure-to-protect theories).
- The city defendants filed a third-party complaint against Kanter seeking contribution and/or indemnity under Pennsylvania law, alleging that if they were liable to Tara, Kanter also breached duties to Tara in her court-appointed role and was therefore a joint tortfeasor under Pennsylvania’s Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act.
- Kanter moved to dismiss the third-party complaint, arguing that § 1983 does not allow contribution and that, as a guardian ad litem, she was absolutely immune from suit.
- The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the city defendants were pursuing state-law contribution/indemnity rather than contribution “under § 1983.”
- Kanter took an interlocutory appeal from the denial of her motion to dismiss.

## Issues

1. Whether the denial of Kanter’s motion to dismiss, based on an asserted immunity from suit, was immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.
2. Whether a court-appointed guardian ad litem (and guardian of the estate) is absolutely immune from state-law contribution and indemnity claims arising from her performance of duties connected to the court’s child-protection proceedings.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit exercised interlocutory jurisdiction because an asserted absolute immunity is an immunity from suit, and denial of that protection can qualify for immediate review under the collateral-order doctrine.
- The court held that Kanter was entitled to absolute (quasi-judicial) immunity for conduct within the scope of her court appointment as guardian ad litem/guardian of the estate.
- The court ruled that absolute immunity barred the city defendants’ state-law contribution and indemnity claims against Kanter, even though those claims were not brought under § 1983.
- The court did not decide whether guardians ad litem are immune from direct § 1983 liability, because the third-party claims against Kanter were pleaded under state law and did not require resolving that federal question.
- The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying dismissal and remanded with instructions to dismiss the third-party complaint against Kanter.

## Legal Principles

- Orders denying a claim of absolute immunity may be immediately appealable as collateral orders because the protection is from being sued, not merely from liability.
- Absolute judicial immunity extends to nonjudicial actors who perform functions closely connected to the judicial process; the analysis focuses on function, not job title.
- A guardian ad litem appointed by a court to represent a child’s interests functions as an arm of the court in carrying out court-directed responsibilities and may receive absolute (quasi-judicial) immunity for acts within that role.
- Absolute immunity bars damages claims that seek to impose liability for protected acts, including claims framed as state-law contribution or indemnity aimed at shifting losses to the court-appointed representative.
- Labeling a third-party demand as “state-law contribution/indemnity” does not avoid immunity when the alleged misconduct concerns the guardian ad litem’s performance of court-related duties.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit held that Nancy Kanter, as a state-court-appointed guardian ad litem and guardian of the estate, was absolutely immune from the city defendants’ state-law contribution and indemnity claims based on her performance of court-connected duties, reversed the district court’s refusal to dismiss, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the third-party complaint.


Tara M. v. City of Philadelphia, 145 F.3d 625 (1998)