## Facts

- The Saeima (Latvia’s Parliament) created a parliamentary investigation committee to examine the actions of the Telecommunications Tariff Council, a body operating under Latvia’s law on telecommunications.
- After completing its investigation, the committee concluded that the council had violated the telecommunications law.
- Following the committee’s findings, the Saeima adopted a resolution that required the Cabinet of Ministers to dismiss the members of the Telecommunications Tariff Council.
- The Saeima argued that there was a strong parliamentary tradition of assigning tasks to state institutions through parliamentary resolutions, and that this tradition supported the resolution directing the Cabinet to act.
- The dispute was brought before the Constitutional Court to determine whether the Saeima had authority to require a specific executive action—dismissal of council members—by ordering the Cabinet of Ministers, a separate constitutional organ, to act through a parliamentary resolution.

## Issues

1. Whether the Saeima may, by resolution, require the Cabinet of Ministers to dismiss members of the Telecommunications Tariff Council.
2. Whether a parliamentary “tradition” of using resolutions to assign tasks can justify binding directions to the Cabinet that compel a concrete executive act.

## Decision

- The Constitutional Court held that the Saeima lacked authority to compel the Cabinet of Ministers, through a parliamentary resolution, to dismiss the members of the Telecommunications Tariff Council.
- The Court rejected reliance on parliamentary tradition as a basis for expanding the Saeima’s powers beyond what the Constitution and applicable law authorize.
- The Court treated the Cabinet of Ministers as a distinct constitutional organ that cannot be subjected to binding, case-specific operational orders from Parliament through a resolution.

## Legal Principles

- Separation of powers requires each constitutional organ to act within the functions assigned by the Constitution and laws; Parliament’s role does not include issuing binding orders that direct the executive to carry out a specific administrative measure.
- Political accountability of the Cabinet to Parliament does not convert Parliament’s political control tools into legal authority to command particular executive decisions in individual cases.
- A parliamentary resolution may express Parliament’s assessment or political position, but it cannot operate as a legal mechanism that compels an executive action where the legal order allocates decision-making to the executive.
- Institutional practice or tradition cannot create new constitutional powers or override the distribution of authority set by the Constitution and statutes.

## Conclusion

Tariff Council Case, Decision No. 03-05 (1999) stands for the rule that Latvia’s Parliament cannot use a resolution to force the Cabinet of Ministers to carry out a specific executive act—here, dismissing Telecommunications Tariff Council members—and that long-standing parliamentary practice cannot substitute for constitutional authorization when one organ attempts to command another.
