## Facts

- Tomika T. Taylor was in a relationship with Avery Moore.
- Moore was the biological father of a ten-month-old boy who lived with his mother, Meshia Powell, in Virginia.
- Moore and Powell were never married and never lived together.
- Moore had seen the child only once since birth.
- No court had entered a custody order concerning the child.
- Moore decided he wanted to take the child and drove with Taylor to Powell’s home.
- When Powell’s father answered the door, Moore and Taylor pushed their way into the residence.
- Powell came downstairs holding the child but refused to allow Moore to hold him.
- As Powell started back up the stairs, Taylor came up behind her and argued with her.
- A physical altercation followed; Taylor pushed Powell and the child was dropped.
- Taylor picked up the child and handed him to Moore.
- Taylor used her body to block Powell from retrieving the child while Moore prevented Powell’s father from intervening.
- Moore and Taylor left the house, got into their car, and drove away with the child.
- Police later apprehended Moore and Taylor.
- Taylor was prosecuted for abduction as a principal in the second degree for assisting Moore.
- After the Commonwealth presented its evidence at trial, Taylor moved to strike, arguing Moore could not commit abduction because he was the child’s father and there was no custody order; the trial court denied the motion and convicted her.
- Taylor appealed her conviction.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Taylor guilty of abduction as a principal in the second degree based on her actions during the taking of the child.
2. Whether Moore’s status as the child’s biological father, in the absence of any custody order, supplied “legal justification or excuse” that would prevent Moore from committing abduction and therefore defeat Taylor’s accomplice liability.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals of Virginia, sitting en banc, affirmed Taylor’s conviction for abduction as a principal in the second degree under Va. Code § 18.2-47 and Va. Code § 18.2-18.
- The court rejected Taylor’s argument that Moore’s biological parentage, without a custody order granting him custodial rights, automatically entitled him to take the child by force from the mother’s custody.
- The court held the evidence supported findings that Moore’s taking was accomplished by force or intimidation and was without legal justification or excuse.
- The court held Taylor’s conduct—pushing Powell, picking up and transferring the child to Moore, and physically blocking Powell’s efforts to recover the child—was active assistance that supported accomplice liability.

## Legal Principles

- Abduction under Va. Code § 18.2-47 requires proof of a taking, transporting, or detention accomplished by force, intimidation, or deception, and done without legal justification or excuse.
- A biological relationship does not, by itself, provide legal justification to seize a child by force from the child’s current lawful custodian; a parent can commit abduction of the parent’s own child when the statutory elements are met.
- In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court views the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the prevailing party at trial.
- A principal in the second degree is criminally responsible when present and intentionally aids, encourages, or assists the principal in the commission of the offense, sharing the criminal intent.
- Conduct such as participating in the confrontation, physically taking possession of the child, handing the child to the principal, and obstructing the custodian’s attempt to regain the child can show affirmative assistance and shared intent.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed Taylor’s abduction conviction because the child’s father did not have legal justification to forcibly remove the infant from the mother’s custody, and Taylor’s physical participation in the taking—transferring the child to Moore and blocking the mother’s efforts to recover him—supported her liability as a principal in the second degree.


Taylor v. Commonwealth, 521 S.E.2d 293 (1999)