## Facts

- Greg Herrick sought FAA technical drawings and specifications for a vintage Fairchild aircraft and submitted a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
- The FAA denied the request under FOIA Exemption 4, asserting the materials contained trade secrets or confidential commercial information; Fairchild objected to disclosure.
- Herrick pursued administrative review and then filed a FOIA lawsuit in federal court; the courts upheld the FAA’s denial and judgment became final.
- Shortly after Herrick’s case ended, Brent Taylor, Herrick’s friend and another aircraft enthusiast, filed a new FOIA request for the same materials, using the same attorney.
- When the FAA did not timely respond, Taylor sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and advanced additional arguments not raised in Herrick’s case, including an alleged waiver reflected in a 1955 letter.
- The FAA and Fairchild (as intervenor) argued Taylor’s suit was barred by claim preclusion because Taylor had been “virtually represented” by Herrick in the earlier litigation.
- The district court and the D.C. Circuit accepted “virtual representation” and held Taylor bound by the prior judgment.

## Issues

1. Whether a nonparty to prior litigation may be barred by claim preclusion based on a broad doctrine of “virtual representation,” consistent with due process and federal preclusion law.
2. What limited circumstances permit binding a nonparty to a prior judgment in federal court.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court unanimously vacated the D.C. Circuit’s judgment and remanded.
- The Court held that the D.C. Circuit’s broad “virtual representation” doctrine is not a valid basis for nonparty claim preclusion.
- The Court reaffirmed the general due process rule that a person is not bound by a judgment in personam in litigation to which the person was not a party, subject only to limited recognized exceptions.
- The Court rejected reliance on informal connections (friendship, shared attorney, aligned interests, similar objectives) as sufficient, without more, to bind a later litigant.
- The Court directed that any nonparty preclusion analysis must fit within established categories that contain defined limits and, where applicable, representative-litigation safeguards.

## Legal Principles

- Nonparty claim preclusion is exceptional; the default rule is that a person who was not a party to a suit did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate and is not bound.
- “Virtual representation” as an open-ended, multi-factor balancing approach is inconsistent with due process because it permits ad hoc binding of absent persons without procedural protections.
- A nonparty may be bound only in limited circumstances, including:
  - Agreement to be bound by the outcome of litigation between others.
  - Certain pre-existing substantive legal relationships (e.g., successive property owners, bailor/bailee, assignor/assignee).
  - Adequate representation in a properly structured representative action (e.g., class action; suits by trustees, guardians), requiring aligned interests plus accountability and procedural safeguards.
  - Assumption of control over the prior litigation by the nonparty.
  - Use of a proxy or agent to relitigate on behalf of a party already bound.
  - Special statutory schemes that expressly restrict successive litigation and comport with due process.
- Similarity of interests alone does not establish “adequate representation”; representative preclusion requires structural protections such as notice and other safeguards typical of representative proceedings.
- Concerns about repetitive litigation do not justify expanding nonparty preclusion beyond recognized limits; other doctrines (including stare decisis and issue preclusion where applicable) mitigate duplication and inconsistency.

## Conclusion

The Court rejected “virtual representation” as a freestanding basis for binding nonparties and held that, absent a recognized exception grounded in due process, a nonparty like Taylor cannot be barred by claim preclusion from bringing an independent FOIA action.


Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008)