Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131 (Cal. 1970)

Facts

  • Alvin Taylor and codefendant James Daniels were charged by information with murder (death of John H. Smith), robbery, and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon against Jack and Linda West.
  • During an attempted robbery of the Wests’ liquor store, Daniels demanded money while repeatedly threatening lethal force and stating that the robbers were armed.
  • Smith, an armed participant, pointed a gun at Jack West while Daniels forced West to the floor and continued issuing threats.
  • Linda West drew a concealed pistol and shot Smith, killing him.
  • Taylor was not inside the store; the prosecution alleged he participated as an accomplice by waiting outside as the getaway driver.
  • Taylor moved under Penal Code § 995 to set aside the murder count; the superior court denied the motion, and Taylor sought a writ of prohibition.

Issues

  1. Whether an accomplice to a robbery may be held liable under the felony-murder rule when the person who fires the fatal shot is the resisting victim, not a felon or accomplice.
  2. Whether, even if felony murder is unavailable, an accomplice may be held to answer for murder on a non–felony-murder theory based on vicarious liability where the robbers’ conduct was sufficiently provocative of lethal resistance to support an inference of malice.

Decision

  • The court held the felony-murder rule did not apply because the killing was committed by the victim rather than by a felon or accomplice.
  • The court held the murder count could nonetheless stand because the evidence permitted a finding of implied malice under a vicarious “provocative act” theory.
  • The court concluded the preliminary hearing evidence provided reasonable or probable cause to hold Taylor to answer for murder on this non–felony-murder basis.
  • The requested writ relief was denied, and the murder count was permitted to proceed.
  • Under California’s agency theory, felony murder does not extend to killings committed by victims or third parties; malice is not imputed to felons through felony murder in that setting.
  • Felony murder is not the exclusive basis for homicide liability arising out of a felony; ordinary accomplice and vicarious liability principles may support murder liability.
  • An accomplice to a robbery may be vicariously liable for a killing proximately caused by confederates’ intentional acts committed with implied malice (conscious disregard for life).
  • The central inquiry for a victim-fired killing is whether the felons’ conduct was sufficiently provocative of lethal resistance to imply malice (the “provocative act” doctrine).

Conclusion

Felony murder could not support a murder charge where a robbery victim killed a co-felon, but the prosecution could proceed on a non–felony-murder theory that the robbers’ gun-pointing and explicit threats provoked lethal resistance and evidenced implied malice, making the alleged accomplice vicariously liable for the resulting death.