## Facts

- Richard J. Taylor, Jr. was tried in federal court on four counts of selling cocaine under 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a).
- Taylor was present when trial began and attended the first morning session.
- The court announced a lunch recess until 2 p.m., and defense counsel told Taylor to return then.
- Taylor did not return after lunch; the judge recessed until the next morning, but Taylor still did not appear.
- Taylor’s wife testified they left court together, rode a taxi to Roxbury, separated there, he did not appear ill, and she had not heard from him.
- Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing Taylor’s absence would prejudice the jury and that continuing would violate his Sixth Amendment rights.
- The trial judge found Taylor’s absence voluntary, denied a mistrial, and continued the trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43.
- The court repeatedly instructed the jury not to draw any inference of guilt from Taylor’s absence.
- The jury convicted Taylor on all counts; after his later arrest, he received the statutory minimum sentence of five years.
- The First Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court affirmed in a per curiam decision.

## Issues

1. Whether a defendant who is present at the start of trial waives the right to be present by voluntarily absenting himself after trial begins, permitting continuation under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43.
2. Whether continuing trial in the defendant’s voluntary absence violates the Sixth Amendment rights to be present and to confront witnesses.
3. Whether waiver by voluntary absence requires proof the defendant knew of the right to be present and that trial would proceed without him, or that he was expressly warned of those consequences.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment upholding Taylor’s convictions.
- The Court held that Taylor’s voluntary absence after trial began in his presence operated as a waiver of his right to be present.
- The Court held it was unnecessary to show Taylor knew of his right to be present or had been expressly warned that trial would continue without him.
- The Court rejected the contention that applying Rule 43 in these circumstances was unconstitutional.

## Legal Principles

- Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43, when trial begins in the defendant’s presence, the defendant’s voluntary absence does not prevent continuation of the trial.
- In noncapital cases, a defendant not in custody who voluntarily absents himself after trial starts waives the right to be present, and proceedings may continue as if he were present.
- Waiver of the right to be present may be inferred from voluntary conduct (absconding mid-trial) and does not require an on-the-record colloquy, express warning, or proof of subjective knowledge of the consequences.
- A court’s supported finding of voluntariness is sufficient to permit continuation without violating the Sixth Amendment presence and confrontation guarantees in the circumstances presented.

## Conclusion

The Court held that a defendant who voluntarily fails to return after trial has begun waives the right to be present, and the trial may continue under Rule 43 without proof the defendant was expressly warned that proceedings would go forward in his absence.


Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973)