## Facts

- Clifford Gerlach alleged defendants struck and beat him on December 25, 1956, causing bodily injury.
- Gail E. Taylor, Gerlach’s minor daughter, alleged she was present and witnessed the beating.
- Taylor sought damages solely for severe fright and emotional distress.
- Taylor did not allege any physical injury or physical disability resulting from her distress.
- Taylor did not allege defendants knew she was present or acted for the purpose of causing her emotional distress.

## Issues

1. Whether a bystander who witnesses a battery of a close family member states a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) without alleging physical injury.
2. Whether such a claim requires allegations that defendants intended to cause the bystander emotional distress or knew, with substantial certainty, that their conduct would cause that bystander severe emotional distress (including knowledge of the bystander’s presence).

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of Taylor’s second count after a general demurrer was sustained.
- The court held the complaint failed to state a cause of action for IIED because it did not allege defendants intended to cause Taylor emotional distress or knew she was present and substantially certain to suffer distress.
- The court did not disturb the first count seeking damages for Gerlach’s bodily injuries, which was not at issue on appeal.

## Legal Principles

- IIED requires allegations that the defendant intentionally caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress: either by acting for the purpose of causing such distress or with knowledge that such distress is substantially certain to result.
- When a plaintiff seeks recovery for emotional distress without alleging resulting bodily harm, the pleading must still allege intentional infliction (purpose or substantial certainty) directed to that plaintiff.
- For a bystander IIED theory based on witnessing harm to another, allegations that the defendant knew of the bystander’s presence (or otherwise acted with substantial certainty as to that bystander’s distress) are necessary; close relationship and foreseeability alone are insufficient.

## Conclusion

Because Taylor alleged only emotional distress from witnessing her father’s beating and did not allege that defendants knew she was present or acted with the purpose or substantial certainty of causing her distress, the complaint did not state an IIED claim, and dismissal was affirmed.


Taylor v. Vallelunga, 171 Cal. App. 2d 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)