## Facts

- L.D., a child with an emotional-behavioral disability, had divorced parents subject to a Vermont family court decree.
- The decree granted L.D.’s father exclusive authority to make educational decisions and participate in L.D.’s education, while Pam Taylor (mother) was granted only a right to receive information about L.D.’s educational progress.
- Taylor sought to exercise rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), including requesting an independent educational evaluation (IEE), disputing aspects of L.D.’s educational programming, seeking amendment of records, and obtaining access to educational records.
- School and state education officials rejected Taylor’s requests, concluding she was not the “parent” authorized to invoke IDEA/FERPA decisionmaking rights because the decree vested educational authority solely in the father.
- Taylor filed a federal action asserting IDEA and FERPA violations and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim premised on FERPA.
- The district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of standing; Taylor appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether IDEA and FERPA permit a natural parent to exercise statutory “parent” rights when a state divorce decree assigns exclusive educational decisionmaking authority to the other parent.
2. Whether IDEA/FERPA preempt state domestic-relations allocations of educational authority.
3. Whether a parent lacking educational decisionmaking authority may still assert a limited IDEA claim for access to the child’s educational records based on residual information rights in the decree.
4. Whether IDEA administrative exhaustion was required, or excused as futile, as to certain defendants.
5. Whether FERPA creates rights enforceable through § 1983.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of Taylor’s IDEA and FERPA claims to the extent they depended on educational decisionmaking authority (including requesting an IEE and pursuing record amendment).
- The court held IDEA and FERPA generally respect state determinations of which parent may make educational decisions, where consistent with federal law.
- The court vacated dismissal and remanded solely on Taylor’s IDEA claim alleging denial of access to L.D.’s educational records, relying on Taylor’s decree-based right to receive reasonable information about L.D.’s health and school progress.
- The court affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 claim based on FERPA because FERPA does not create individually enforceable rights under § 1983.
- The court held IDEA exhaustion was not required against certain defendants because administrative relief would have been futile.
- The court rejected Taylor’s argument that the magistrate judge committed fundamental error by not recusing himself sua sponte.
- Disposition: affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

## Legal Principles

- IDEA and FERPA do not displace state domestic-relations law assigning educational decisionmaking authority; a state custody decree may define which parent may exercise IDEA/FERPA “parent” rights.
- A parent denied educational decisionmaking authority by decree generally lacks standing to assert IDEA/FERPA claims that would conflict with the decree’s allocation.
- Residual decree-based rights to receive information about a child’s schooling may support a narrow IDEA claim for access to the child’s educational records, even when broader decisionmaking rights are absent.
- FERPA does not create rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- IDEA exhaustion is not required where administrative proceedings cannot realistically provide relief and pursuit of those remedies would be futile.

## Conclusion

The court held that federal special-education and student-records statutes ordinarily follow state custody allocations of educational authority, leaving Taylor without standing for most IDEA/FERPA claims, but allowing a limited IDEA records-access claim consistent with her decree-based right to information, while also foreclosing FERPA-based § 1983 relief and excusing exhaustion where futile.


Taylor v. Vt. Dep’t of Educ., 313 F.3d 768 (2d Cir. 2002)