Facts
- Edward Tebedo owned real property adjoining a 30-foot strip of land in New York.
- Successive owners of the strip, including Ralph Nye, the McLaughlins, and later the Barrows, allegedly promised Tebedo that the strip would be conveyed to him, but no conveyance occurred.
- Tebedo alleged he made improvements to the strip in reliance on these promises.
- The McLaughlins acquired the strip from Nye and later conveyed it to the Barrows in 1959.
- After selling their New York property, the McLaughlins moved to Florida and allegedly no longer owned any New York real property.
- Tebedo sued for conveyance of the strip (specific relief) or, alternatively, damages for reliance-based improvements.
- The McLaughlins moved pre-answer to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting their nonresidency and lack of current New York property.
Issues
- Whether New York may exercise personal jurisdiction under CPLR § 302 over nonresident defendants for claims arising from their prior ownership and conveyance of New York real property, even though they later moved out of state and no longer own New York property.
- Whether Tebedo’s claims concerning promised conveyance and reliance-based improvements “arise from” the defendants’ ownership, use, or possession of New York realty within the meaning of CPLR § 302.
Decision
- The court denied the McLaughlins’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
- The court held that CPLR § 302’s real-property basis for specific jurisdiction is satisfied where the cause of action arises from the defendants’ relationship to New York realty at the time the claim accrued.
- The court rejected the argument that jurisdiction depends on the defendants’ continued ownership of New York property at the time suit is brought.
Legal Principles
- CPLR § 302 permits specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident where the cause of action arises from the defendant’s ownership, use, or possession of real property in New York.
- For the real-property subdivision of CPLR § 302, the jurisdictional nexus is evaluated by the defendant’s relationship to the New York realty when the cause of action arose, not by property ownership or residency at the time of suit.
- Allegations that a defendant’s promises and conveyance-related conduct concerning New York land caused reliance-based injury can satisfy the statutory “arising from” requirement.
Conclusion
The court allowed the action to proceed against the McLaughlins, holding that New York’s long-arm statute supports jurisdiction for claims tied to their earlier ownership and conveyance of New York real property, notwithstanding their later move out of state and lack of current New York holdings.