## Facts

- Texas enacted a state hemp program regulating cultivation, handling, and consumable hemp products.
- Texas law prohibited “the processing and manufacturing of a consumable hemp product for smoking,” and DSHS adopted an implementing rule, 25 Tex. Admin. Code § 300.104.
- Several hemp businesses that manufactured, processed, distributed, and sold hemp products sued DSHS and its commissioner, alleging the smokable-hemp manufacturing/processing prohibition violated the Texas Constitution’s due course of law clause (art. I, § 19).
- The trial court declared the statutory prohibition unconstitutional, held the rule invalid in its entirety, and permanently enjoined enforcement.
- DSHS pursued a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas from the injunction order based on the statute’s constitutionality.

## Issues

1. Whether the Texas Constitution’s due course of law clause (art. I, § 19) substantively protects an economic liberty or property interest in manufacturing and processing smokable hemp.
2. If the statute is constitutional, whether the implementing rule, 25 Tex. Admin. Code § 300.104, is independently invalid.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the trial court’s judgment and dissolved the permanent injunction.
- The court held the due course claim failed at the threshold because the asserted interest—manufacturing and processing smokable hemp—was not a “life, liberty, or property” interest protected by art. I, § 19.
- Because no protected interest was implicated, the court did not proceed to evaluate the ban’s reasonableness under heightened economic-liberty review.
- The court rejected the separate challenge to 25 Tex. Admin. Code § 300.104 and left the rule in force.

## Legal Principles

- A substantive due course challenge under Tex. Const. art. I, § 19 requires, as a preliminary matter, identification of a protected “life, liberty, or property” interest; not every economic interest or business method qualifies.
- The asserted interest must be framed with specificity; a general right to work does not convert a particular commercial activity into a constitutionally protected interest.
- Only if a protected interest is shown does the court proceed to assess whether regulation is unconstitutionally burdensome under economic-liberty doctrine (including the framework discussed in Patel).
- Historical treatment and traditional legality may inform whether an asserted occupation resembles a “common occupation” protected as economic liberty.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Texas held that the due course of law clause does not protect an asserted right to manufacture and process smokable hemp, reversed the judgment declaring the statutory ban unconstitutional, vacated the injunction, and upheld the implementing administrative rule.


Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs. v. Crown Distrib. L.L.C., 647 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. 2022)