Thacker v. Commonwealth, 114 S.E. 504 (Va. 1922)

Facts

  • John Thacker and two companions became intoxicated at a church festival in Alleghany County, Virginia, then walked along a county road late at night.
  • Near a sharp curve, they encountered a tent used as a summer campsite by Mrs. J.A. Ratrie, her children, and a servant; a lighted lamp was inside the tent near the bed.
  • After pistol shots were heard from the road, a man said he would “shoot that Goddamned light out,” while another voice urged him not to.
  • The men approached the tent and asked to stay the night; Mrs. Ratrie refused due to lack of space, and the men initially left.
  • After circling the tent, Thacker used vulgar language and returned to the road, again stating he would “shoot the light out.”
  • Thacker fired three shots; two struck and passed through the tent, and one passed through the head of the bed, narrowly missing Mrs. Ratrie and a baby sleeping with her.
  • Thacker testified he did not know the occupants, bore no ill will, and intended only to shoot at the light.

Issues

  1. What elements constitute an “attempt” under Virginia criminal law?
  2. Whether the evidence proved the specific intent to kill required for attempted murder when the defendant claimed he intended only to shoot out a light.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the attempted murder conviction and remanded.
  • The court held that an attempt requires both a specific intent to commit the crime and a direct, ineffectual act toward its commission.
  • Although firing into an occupied tent was a dangerous overt act, the record did not sufficiently prove a specific intent to murder Mrs. Ratrie (or any person).
  • The court noted the conduct could support some other criminal offense, but not attempted murder on this proof of intent.
  • Criminal attempt consists of (1) intent to commit the contemplated offense and (2) a direct, ineffectual act toward its commission that goes beyond preparation.
  • Intent may be inferred from conduct only to the extent “realized in the act,” and may not be presumed beyond what the act itself shows.
  • Use of a weapon likely to cause death does not, by itself, permit a presumption that the actor intended to murder.
  • Where an offense is defined as an act combined with a particular intent, that intent must be proved as a distinct element.

Conclusion

The court reversed because attempted murder demands proof of a formed purpose to kill; extremely dangerous shooting, without sufficient evidence of that specific intent, is inadequate to sustain an attempted murder conviction.