## Facts

- Walter Thatcher sued Bert Brennan and Brennan’s employer, Mead Johnson & Company (Mead), after a physical altercation in Jackson, Mississippi, in May 1984.
- Mead had employed Brennan since February 1982 as a medical-sales specialist whose job required travel; Brennan’s sales territory included Jackson.
- Mead provided Brennan with a company car and reimbursed his travel expenses when he traveled for work, including trips to Jackson.
- On the day of the incident, Brennan made sales calls near his home in Louisiana and then drove to Jackson in the company car for work-related activities.
- After arriving in Jackson, Brennan checked into a hotel and completed paperwork for Mead.
- Brennan then drove to a post office to mail the paperwork for Mead and began driving back toward the hotel.
- During that return trip, Brennan turned in front of Thatcher’s vehicle, leading to a verbal dispute between the drivers that escalated as they continued driving.
- The dispute ended when both vehicles stopped and Brennan and Thatcher engaged in a fight in a parking lot.
- For purposes of Mead’s summary-judgment motion, Mead did not dispute that Brennan initiated the fight without provocation from Thatcher.
- Thatcher pursued two theories against Mead: (1) vicarious liability under respondeat superior for Brennan’s assault, and (2) direct liability for negligent hiring.
- The negligent-hiring claim rested solely on pre-employment personality and adaptability tests indicating Brennan might be moody, opinionated, headstrong, and “high aggression,” and might be experiencing emotional stress; there was no evidence of other incidents suggesting Brennan had violent tendencies.

## Issues

1. Whether Mead could be held vicariously liable under Mississippi respondeat superior law for Brennan’s intentional assault, where the altercation arose from a traffic dispute during Brennan’s work-related travel.
2. Whether Mead could be held liable for negligent hiring based only on pre-employment test results describing aggressive or moody traits, absent evidence of prior violent conduct or other notice that Brennan was likely to commit an assault.

## Decision

- The court granted Mead’s motion for summary judgment.
- On respondeat superior, the court held Brennan’s assault was outside the course and scope of employment because it stemmed from a personal traffic dispute rather than an act done to serve Mead’s business.
- The fact that Brennan was on a business trip, driving a company car, and had just completed a work errand did not convert a personal fight into conduct within the scope of employment.
- On negligent hiring, the court held Thatcher’s proof—limited to personality/adaptability test descriptions—was insufficient to show Mead knew or should have known Brennan posed a foreseeable risk of committing a violent assault.
- With no evidence of prior or subsequent violent acts or similar warnings, Mead was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the negligent-hiring claim.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
- Under Mississippi respondeat superior doctrine, an employer is liable for an employee’s tort only when the employee acts within the course and scope of employment and at least partly to serve the employer.
- An intentional assault arising from a personal quarrel—such as a traffic-related confrontation—is outside the scope of employment when it is not connected to the employee’s assigned duties and does not further the employer’s business.
- Work travel, use of an employer-provided vehicle, or timing near work-related tasks does not by itself make an intentional tort attributable to the employer.
- Negligent hiring requires proof that the employer knew or should have known, through reasonable care, that the employee was unfit in a way that created a foreseeable risk of the type of harm that occurred.
- General personality-test characterizations suggesting aggressiveness, moodiness, or stress—without a history of violence or other concrete warning signs—do not establish notice of a propensity for physical assault.

## Conclusion

The court entered summary judgment for Mead Johnson because Brennan’s road-rage assault was a personal act unrelated to serving Mead’s business and therefore outside the scope of employment, and because Thatcher’s negligent-hiring theory—based only on pre-employment test descriptors and not on any history or notice of violent conduct—could not show that Mead should have foreseen the assault.


Thatcher v. Brennan, 657 F. Supp. 6 (1986)