## Facts

- George Otis and Jonathan Thaxter alleged they owned three-quarters of the schooner *Tilton* and were entitled to her possession.
- The *Tilton* suffered a casualty (described in the case as a wreck/stranding or severe damage), after which the master purported to sell the vessel.
- Schenck, McCabe, and Smith claimed title to the entire vessel through that purchase and held possession under the asserted sale.
- Otis and Thaxter denied the master had authority to sell and filed a libel in admiralty seeking restoration of title and possession (a suit in the nature of petitory and possessory relief).
- The controversy turned on (1) whether admiralty could decide title and possession to reinstate dispossessed owners and (2) whether the casualty created the “extreme necessity” required for a master’s sale to bind the owners.

## Issues

1. Whether a federal admiralty court has jurisdiction over petitory as well as possessory suits concerning title to and possession of a vessel, so that it may reinstate owners wrongfully displaced from possession.
2. Whether a ship’s master, merely by virtue of office, has authority to sell the vessel, and if not, what level of necessity must exist to make such a sale valid against the owners.
3. Whether the evidence showed an extreme necessity (wreck, unnavigability, inability to communicate with owners, and lack of reasonable alternatives) sufficient to support the master’s sale of the *Tilton*.
4. Whether purchasers who acted in good faith and paid value obtain good title if the master lacked authority to sell.

## Decision

- The court held that admiralty has jurisdiction of petitory and possessory suits to reinstate owners of ships who have been wrongfully displaced from their possession.
- The court held that a master has no general authority to sell the vessel; a sale is justified only in cases of extreme necessity (such as where the vessel is wrecked or rendered unnavigable and a sale is reasonably required to save value for the owners).
- Applying that standard, the court concluded the circumstances did not establish the required necessity and therefore the master’s sale could not divest the owners’ title.
- The court rejected the respondents’ claim of title derived from the master’s sale and sustained the libel, granting relief consistent with restoring the owners’ title and possession.
- The court also recognized that, when true necessity exists for disposition of a wrecked vessel, admiralty can decree a sale upon the master’s application, providing a lawful route for transfer rather than a disputed private sale.

## Legal Principles

- Admiralty jurisdiction extends to both possessory suits (to recover possession) and petitory suits (to try title) involving vessels, including relief to reinstate owners displaced from possession.
- A ship’s master is an agent of limited authority and, by office alone, has no power to sell the ship.
- A master’s sale is valid against the owners only upon proof of extreme necessity—typically involving a wreck or comparable disablement, an inability to consult the owners within a reasonable time, and the absence of reasonable alternatives to preserve the owners’ interests.
- Purchasers, even if bona fide and for value, take no better title than the seller possessed; if the master lacked authority to sell, the sale does not bind the owners.
- Admiralty may order a judicial sale of a wrecked vessel on proper application, supplying a recognized method for transfer when emergency conditions justify sale.

## Conclusion

*The Tilton* confirms that federal admiralty may hear both petitory and possessory proceedings to determine title and restore possession of a vessel to the owners, and it holds that a master’s private sale passes title only in extreme necessity; because that necessity was not shown, the buyers took no valid title and the owners were entitled to have their rights restored.


*The Tilton*, 23 F. Cas. 1277 (C.C.D. Mass. 1830) (No. 14,054)

The Tilton, 23 F. Cas. 1277 (C.C.D. Mass. 1830) (No. 14,054)