## Facts

- John Thing, a minor, was struck and seriously injured by an automobile driven by James V. La Chusa.
- John’s mother, Maria E. Thing, was nearby but did not see or hear the collision as it happened.
- Maria learned of the accident only after her daughter told her that John had been hit.
- Maria ran to the location and saw John lying in the street, bloody and unconscious.
- Maria alleged that seeing her injured child caused her serious emotional and nervous-system injury, proximately resulting from La Chusa’s negligence.

## Issues

1. Whether a close relative who does not witness an injury-producing event may recover bystander damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress after arriving moments later and observing the victim’s condition.
2. Whether the Dillon v. Legg bystander guidelines should be reformulated into more definite limits on duty and liability for emotional distress.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Appeal and reinstated summary judgment for La Chusa.
- The court held that bystander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress is available only when the plaintiff proves all elements of a three-part rule: (1) close relationship to the victim; (2) presence at the scene at the time of the injury-producing event and contemporaneous awareness it is causing injury; and (3) serious emotional distress beyond that expected of a disinterested witness.
- Maria Thing could not recover because she neither witnessed nor contemporaneously perceived the accident and therefore was not within the class to whom the defendant owed a duty under the bystander rule.

## Legal Principles

- “Negligent infliction of emotional distress” in this setting is not an independent tort; it is a negligence claim governed by duty limits.
- For bystander emotional-distress damages absent physical injury or impact to the plaintiff, duty is confined to plaintiffs who:
  - are closely related to the injury victim;
  - are present at the scene when the injury-producing event occurs and are then aware it is causing injury; and
  - suffer serious emotional distress beyond that anticipated in a disinterested witness.
- Dillon v. Legg’s factors are not open-ended foreseeability considerations for expanding liability; they function as limitations on recovery.
- Foreseeability of emotional harm alone does not define duty; duty reflects policy choices, including the need to avoid unlimited and unpredictable liability.
- A plaintiff who learns of the event from others and arrives after the event, even minutes later, does not satisfy the contemporaneous presence-and-awareness requirement.

## Conclusion

The court limited bystander negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims to plaintiffs who are closely related to the victim and who contemporaneously perceive the injury-producing event with awareness of the resulting harm; because the mother arrived after the collision and did not perceive it as it occurred, she could not recover.


Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989)