Facts
- John Thing, a minor, was struck and seriously injured by an automobile driven by James V. La Chusa.
- John’s mother, Maria E. Thing, was nearby but did not see or hear the collision as it happened.
- Maria learned of the accident only after her daughter told her that John had been hit.
- Maria ran to the location and saw John lying in the street, bloody and unconscious.
- Maria alleged that seeing her injured child caused her serious emotional and nervous-system injury, proximately resulting from La Chusa’s negligence.
Issues
- Whether a close relative who does not witness an injury-producing event may recover bystander damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress after arriving moments later and observing the victim’s condition.
- Whether the Dillon v. Legg bystander guidelines should be reformulated into more definite limits on duty and liability for emotional distress.
Decision
- The Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Appeal and reinstated summary judgment for La Chusa.
- The court held that bystander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress is available only when the plaintiff proves all elements of a three-part rule: (1) close relationship to the victim; (2) presence at the scene at the time of the injury-producing event and contemporaneous awareness it is causing injury; and (3) serious emotional distress beyond that expected of a disinterested witness.
- Maria Thing could not recover because she neither witnessed nor contemporaneously perceived the accident and therefore was not within the class to whom the defendant owed a duty under the bystander rule.
Legal Principles
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“Negligent infliction of emotional distress” in this setting is not an independent tort; it is a negligence claim governed by duty limits.
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For bystander emotional-distress damages absent physical injury or impact to the plaintiff, duty is confined to plaintiffs who:
- are closely related to the injury victim;
- are present at the scene when the injury-producing event occurs and are then aware it is causing injury; and
- suffer serious emotional distress beyond that anticipated in a disinterested witness.
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Dillon v. Legg’s factors are not open-ended foreseeability considerations for expanding liability; they function as limitations on recovery.
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Foreseeability of emotional harm alone does not define duty; duty reflects policy choices, including the need to avoid unlimited and unpredictable liability.
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A plaintiff who learns of the event from others and arrives after the event, even minutes later, does not satisfy the contemporaneous presence-and-awareness requirement.
Conclusion
The court limited bystander negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims to plaintiffs who are closely related to the victim and who contemporaneously perceive the injury-producing event with awareness of the resulting harm; because the mother arrived after the collision and did not perceive it as it occurred, she could not recover.