## Facts

- Ronald Thomas published a local newspaper editorial criticizing Donna Wixon, the City Clerk of Baxter Springs, Kansas, and city government.
- After consulting City Attorney Robert E. Myers, Wixon filed a municipal criminal complaint alleging Thomas violated the city’s criminal-defamation ordinance.
- The ordinance defined criminal defamation as communicating information “knowing the information is false and with actual malice,” tending to expose a person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive the person of public confidence or social acceptance.
- Thomas was arrested and prosecuted in municipal court based on the complaint and ordinance.
- Thomas filed a federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City, Wixon, and Myers, alleging (among other claims) that the ordinance was unconstitutional (vagueness and overbreadth) and that defendants used the criminal process to retaliate against his protected political speech.
- The City and Wixon moved to dismiss key claims under Rule 12(b)(6); the opinion addressed those pleading-stage motions.

## Issues

1. Whether the municipal criminal-defamation ordinance was plausibly subject to a facial First Amendment and due process challenge for vagueness and overbreadth.
2. Whether Thomas plausibly stated a § 1983 claim that defendants retaliated against him for protected political speech by initiating and pursuing criminal-defamation charges.
3. Whether the allegations were sufficient at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage to allow claims against the City and relevant officials to proceed, including theories of municipal liability based on enforcement of the ordinance.

## Decision

- The court denied the motion to dismiss the constitutional challenge to the criminal-defamation ordinance, holding Thomas plausibly alleged vagueness and overbreadth.
- The court allowed Thomas’s core § 1983 retaliation claims based on arrest and prosecution following the critical editorial to proceed at the pleading stage.
- The court granted dismissal in part as to certain narrower claims, theories, or forms of relief, but did not eliminate the principal ordinance-based and retaliation claims.

## Legal Principles

- On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor; dismissal is improper unless no set of facts consistent with the complaint would permit relief.
- Political criticism of public officials is protected First Amendment speech; government officials may not use criminal enforcement to punish or deter such speech.
- A criminal-defamation law aimed at speech on public issues must satisfy First Amendment constraints, including an “actual malice” requirement (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth).
- A local ordinance modeled on a state statute previously narrowed by state-court construction may still be challenged under § 1983, including facial and as-applied challenges based on the ordinance’s text and alleged enforcement.
- Vagueness and overbreadth challenges in the speech context often cannot be resolved on the pleadings where the allegations plausibly indicate chilling effects or arbitrary enforcement.
- Municipal liability may be plausibly alleged where enforcement of an ordinance is treated as city policy, rather than an isolated act by a single employee.

## Conclusion

The district court largely denied dismissal, holding that Thomas plausibly alleged the city’s criminal-defamation ordinance was unconstitutional and that city officials used criminal charges to retaliate against protected political criticism, allowing the central § 1983 claims to proceed beyond the pleading stage.


Thomas v. City of Baxter Springs, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (D. Kan. 2005)