## Facts

- Helen A. Thompson purchased a residence in Albert Lea, Minnesota, taking title subject to rights previously granted to Charles Baxter.
- The prior owner had leased the premises to Baxter for monthly rent of $22.
- The instrument granted Baxter possession “unto [him] his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, for and during the full term of while he shall wish to live in Albert Lea,” beginning December 1, 1904.
- Baxter continuously occupied the premises and paid rent as it became due.
- Thompson served Baxter with notice to quit and, after he refused to vacate, brought a forcible entry and unlawful detainer action to recover possession.
- The justice court entered judgment for Baxter; on appeal, the district court (bench trial on a stipulation) dismissed the action, concluding Baxter held a life estate terminable only on death or removal from Albert Lea.

## Issues

1. Whether a grant of possession “for and during the full term of while [the tenant] shall wish to live in Albert Lea,” with monthly rent reserved, creates a terminable landlord-tenant estate (at will/sufferance/periodic) or a life estate determinable upon death or leaving the city.
2. What characteristics distinguish tenancies at will, at sufferance, and month-to-month tenancies from a life estate when an instrument uses atypical duration language.

## Decision

- The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the unlawful detainer action.
- The court held the language “for and during the full term of while he shall wish to live in Albert Lea” vested in Baxter a life estate.
- Baxter’s estate was terminable only upon his death or his removal from Albert Lea, not at Thompson’s election by notice to quit.
- The court rejected classifying the interest as a tenancy at will, at sufferance, or a month-to-month tenancy, notwithstanding the monthly rent provision.

## Legal Principles

- An instrument’s durational language controls whether it creates a leasehold tenancy terminable by notice or a freehold estate measured by a life and/or a stated condition.
- A life estate is not unilaterally terminable by the grantor before the stated terminating event; unlawful detainer will not lie where the occupant holds such an estate and remains within its terms.
- Payment of rent in recurring amounts does not, by itself, convert an interest into a periodic tenancy if the grant otherwise fixes duration by a life-related measure or specified condition.
- Tenancies at will, at sufferance, and month-to-month tenancies are distinguished from life estates by their terminability and by whether possession continues only by ongoing consent or by a vested estate defined by the granting clause.

## Conclusion

The court construed the unusual “while he shall wish to live in Albert Lea” term as creating a life estate determinable upon Baxter’s death or leaving the city; because Baxter remained in Albert Lea and paid rent, Thompson could not terminate his right of possession through notice and unlawful detainer.


Thompson v. Baxter, 119 N.W. 797 (Minn. 1909)