Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)

Facts

  • Byron Thornhill, a union local president, participated in an authorized strike against his employer, Brown Wood Preserving Company.
  • Thornhill peacefully picketed near the company’s premises and carried a sign publicizing the labor dispute.
  • Alabama prosecuted Thornhill under Alabama Code § 3448 (1923), which criminalized going near, loitering about, or picketing a business to influence others not to trade or work there or to hinder a lawful business.
  • Thornhill was convicted of “loitering and picketing as charged,” fined $100, and sentenced to jail upon nonpayment.
  • Alabama appellate courts affirmed after construing § 3448 broadly to forbid publicizing labor-dispute facts near the business, regardless of the peaceful nature of the conduct.

Issues

  1. Whether Alabama Code § 3448, as construed and applied to peaceful labor picketing, violated freedom of speech and of the press under the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
  2. Whether the statute was facially invalid because it broadly criminalized protected expression rather than targeting specific, regulable harms.

Decision

  • The U.S. Supreme Court reversed Thornhill’s conviction.
  • The Court held § 3448 facially unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
  • The statute did not target only conduct within the state’s legitimate regulatory authority; it swept in ordinary, peaceful methods of communicating information about labor disputes.
  • Alabama did not show that the peaceful picketing at issue created a clear and present danger of violence, property destruction, or breach of the peace.
  • Freedom of speech and of the press are protected from state abridgment through the Fourteenth Amendment.
  • Speech concerning labor conditions and labor disputes is a matter of public concern and lies within First Amendment protection.
  • A penal statute may be held facially invalid when its breadth creates a pervasive restraint on protected discussion and it criminalizes a substantial range of protected expression.
  • States may regulate coercive, violent, or obstructive conduct, but broad prohibitions on peaceful informational picketing are unconstitutional absent a showing of imminent, serious harm.

Conclusion

The Court set aside Thornhill’s conviction and invalidated Alabama’s sweeping anti-picketing statute because it broadly criminalized peaceful communication about labor disputes without being confined to preventing imminent violence or other specific, regulable misconduct.