## Facts

- Mrs. Threatt originally owned timberlands in fee simple, then conveyed the fee to her children while reserving a life estate.
- A daughter later conveyed back to Mrs. Threatt an undivided one-fourth fee interest, making her both (1) life tenant of the whole and (2) a one-fourth tenant in common in the fee with her children.
- The land’s principal value was standing timber; evidence estimated the tract contained about 1,019,300 board feet.
- In 1976, Mrs. Threatt arranged for Henry Cornish to cut mature timber, asserting the cutting was selective thinning to improve the stand; her children disputed that they consented or were consulted.
- Cornish agreed to pay set rates per thousand board feet for pine and hardwood, with proceeds paid to Mrs. Threatt.
- The children alleged substantial timber was cut and sold without their consent, reducing the value of their remainder and common fee interests.
- The children sued in chancery court for an injunction and money damages; an interim agreed order halted cutting, allowed removal of felled timber, and required an accounting with proceeds allocated between Mrs. Threatt and the children.
- After trial, the chancellor enjoined further cutting and entered a $9,344.26 money decree against Mrs. Threatt, Henry Cornish, and Glen Cornish.

## Issues

1. Whether a person holding a life estate plus an undivided one-fourth fee interest may cut and sell substantial standing timber without consulting or obtaining consent from cotenant remaindermen.
2. Whether the manner, extent, and commercial character of the timber cutting constituted actionable waste.
3. Whether injunctive relief and a money decree against the life tenant and timber cutters were proper remedies.

## Decision

- The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court’s injunction and the $9,344.26 money decree.
- The court held that Mrs. Threatt’s dual status as life tenant and one-fourth fee cotenant did not permit unilateral commercial removal of substantial timber from land chiefly valuable for timber, without cotenants’ consent.
- The court upheld the chancellor’s finding that the cutting constituted waste and that equitable and monetary relief were supported by the evidence.

## Legal Principles

- A life tenant is entitled to ordinary use and enjoyment of property but must not commit waste that prejudices remaindermen.
- When land is chiefly valuable for standing timber, substantial timber removal for sale is treated as a depletion of the estate’s corpus and may constitute waste.
- A cotenant may not, without consent of other cotenants, deal with common property in a way that destroys or materially impairs the value of the common estate.
- Equity may enjoin threatened or ongoing waste, and damages may be awarded for timber wrongfully removed and sold; joint liability may attach to participating cutters based on the proven loss.

## Conclusion

A life tenant who also owns a fractional fee interest cannot, without consent of cotenant remaindermen, commercially cut and sell substantial standing timber from land primarily valuable for timber; such conduct is waste warranting an injunction and damages.


Threatt v. Rushing, 361 So. 2d 329 (Miss. 1978)