## Facts

- Click-to-Call Technologies, LP owned U.S. Patent No. 5,818,836 (issued in 1998), directed to technology for anonymous telephone calls.
- In 2001, Click-to-Call sued Thryv, Inc. for patent infringement, then voluntarily dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
- In 2013, Thryv petitioned the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for inter partes review (IPR) of the ’836 patent.
- Click-to-Call argued the petition was barred by 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), which forbids instituting IPR if the petition is filed more than one year after the petitioner was served with an infringement complaint.
- The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) rejected the time-bar argument, reasoning that the 2001 action’s dismissal without prejudice meant the earlier service did not trigger § 315(b)’s one-year limit.
- The PTAB instituted IPR and later issued a final written decision canceling 13 patent claims as anticipated or obvious.
- Click-to-Call did not challenge the PTAB’s patentability analysis on appeal. Instead, it argued only that the PTAB lacked authority to institute IPR because the petition was untimely under § 315(b).
- The Federal Circuit initially dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to review the institution decision. On rehearing, it concluded the petition was time-barred and vacated the PTAB’s final written decision.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether § 314(d) bars judicial review of the PTAB’s application of § 315(b)’s one-year limit.

## Issues

1. Does 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) preclude judicial review of the PTAB’s determination, made in instituting IPR, that a petition is not barred by § 315(b)’s one-year time limit?

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit.
- By a 7–2 vote, the Court held that § 314(d) bars appellate review of the PTAB’s application of § 315(b)’s one-year time limit.
- The Court reasoned that the time-bar question is tightly connected to the decision “whether to institute” IPR, which Congress made “final and nonappealable” in § 314(d).
- Because Click-to-Call’s appeal sought to overturn the PTAB’s institution decision by relabeling the dispute as a § 315(b) statutory question, it fell within § 314(d)’s bar on review.
- The Court’s ruling reinstated the PTAB’s cancellation of the 13 claims.

## Legal Principles

- 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) generally bars appellate review of the Director’s decision whether to institute inter partes review.
- Under *Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee*, § 314(d) bars review of challenges that are closely tied to the agency’s application and interpretation of statutes governing institution.
- Section 315(b)’s one-year limit is a prerequisite to institution (“may not be instituted”), so disputes about the PTAB’s application of that limit fall within § 314(d)’s nonappealability rule.
- The § 314(d) bar does not necessarily foreclose every challenge connected to IPR proceedings; the Court has indicated that some claims (for example, certain constitutional objections or matters not tied to institution) may remain reviewable.
- A party cannot obtain appellate relief from an adverse final written decision by attacking only the PTAB’s institution-stage timeliness ruling under § 315(b).

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that § 314(d) prevents appellate courts from reviewing the PTAB’s determination that an IPR petition is timely under § 315(b), because that determination is part of the decision whether to institute IPR; accordingly, the Federal Circuit lacked authority to vacate the PTAB’s final written decision on timeliness grounds, and the PTAB’s cancellation of 13 claims was reinstated.


Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call-Technologies, LP, 590 U.S. 45, 140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020)