## Facts

- Donna P. Thurmond attended a night minor-league baseball game at G. Richard Pfitzner Stadium in August 1997.
- The stadium displayed entrance signs warning spectators to be alert because batted or thrown objects may be dangerous.
- The back of the admission ticket contained language stating the ticket holder assumes risks incidental to baseball, including injury from batted balls.
- The team reserved a limited number of screened seats behind home plate for spectators who requested to be reseated from unscreened areas.
- Thurmond sat “high in the bleachers” on the third-base side in an unscreened area.
- It was her first visit to the stadium; she testified she did not know she could request screened seating, did not notice the signs, and did not read the ticket warning.
- Thurmond had attended two prior major-league games and knew foul balls can enter the stands, but claimed she did not understand the extent of the risk to her particular location or the speed at which a line-drive foul ball could reach it.
- In the eighth inning, a line-drive foul ball struck Thurmond in the face, causing serious injuries.
- Thurmond sued the stadium operator and the affiliated major-league club for negligence in operating/maintaining the stadium and for inadequate warnings.

## Issues

1. Whether, on summary judgment, Thurmond assumed the risk as a matter of law of being struck by a batted foul ball while seated in an unscreened area.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants and remanded.
- The court held that the record, viewed in Thurmond’s favor, permitted a jury to find she did not subjectively know and fully appreciate the specific risk that a line-drive foul ball could strike her in her seating location.
- The court ruled that posted signs, ticket language, and general knowledge about foul balls were evidence relevant to assumption of risk, but did not conclusively establish it on this record.

## Legal Principles

- Assumption of risk in Virginia requires (1) the plaintiff’s subjective knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk and (2) voluntary exposure to that risk.
- The inquiry is subjective; it turns on what the particular plaintiff actually knew and appreciated, not what a reasonable person should have known.
- Assumption of risk is generally a jury question; summary judgment is proper only when reasonable minds could not differ.
- The existence of warnings (e.g., signage or ticket disclaimers) does not automatically impute knowledge; whether the plaintiff saw, understood, and appreciated the warned-of danger may present factual disputes precluding summary judgment.

## Conclusion

The court held that, despite common awareness of foul-ball dangers and the presence of stadium and ticket warnings, a jury could reasonably find that Thurmond lacked subjective appreciation of the specific risk in her seating area; therefore, assumption of risk could not be decided as a matter of law on summary judgment.


Thurmond v. Prince William Pro. Baseball Club, Inc., 574 S.E.2d 246 (Va. 2003)