## Facts

- Larry Duckworth drove on a rain-slick road, encountered water flowing onto the roadway from a car wash drainage area, lost control, and collided with Bruce Tolbert’s vehicle.
- An investigating officer cited Duckworth for driving too fast for conditions but later testified Duckworth could not have anticipated the water when turning the corner.
- In a consolidated companion case, Brenda Smith drove under the speed limit in the rain, hydroplaned into another lane, and collided with William O. Shelton III’s vehicle.
- Tolbert and Shelton each sued the other driver for negligence.
- In both trials, defendants asserted the collisions were non-negligent occurrences and requested an “accident” instruction.

## Issues

1. Whether Georgia trial courts should continue to give a separate “accident” jury instruction as a defense in civil negligence cases.
2. Whether the traditional accident charge is misleading or confusing in light of standard negligence, causation, and burden-of-proof instructions.
3. Whether any change to the use of the accident charge should apply retroactively to the consolidated cases.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the “accident” jury instruction should not be given in future civil cases.
- The Court affirmed the judgments for defendants in both consolidated cases, leaving the verdicts undisturbed.
- The Court reasoned that standard negligence instructions already cover the concept that absence of negligence means no liability, making a separate accident charge unnecessary and potentially confusing.

## Legal Principles

- A separate “accident” defense instruction in civil negligence cases is improper going forward because it is redundant and risks confusing jurors.
- An accident charge is misleading if it suggests an “accident” can exist when negligence by a nonparty caused the injury, despite defining accident as occurring in the absence of negligence.
- Use of the term “accident” can confuse jurors by blending its legal meaning (absence of negligence and no liability) with its common meaning (unintended event), potentially implying no liability without regard to negligence.
- Standard instructions requiring the plaintiff to prove negligence and proximate causation sufficiently inform the jury that, if no negligence is found, the plaintiff cannot recover.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Georgia prospectively eliminated the accident jury instruction as a separate defense in civil negligence trials because it is misleading and duplicative, but affirmed the defense verdicts in the consolidated cases.


Tolbert v. Duckworth, 262 Ga. 622, 423 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. 1992)