## Facts

- Adrienne E. Tomkins worked for Public Service Electric & Gas Company (PSE&G) as an office worker and was nearing eligibility for promotion when assigned to supervisor Herbert D. Reppin.
- Tomkins alleged Reppin invited her to lunch under the pretext of discussing her career prospects and made unwanted sexual advances.
- She alleged Reppin conditioned favorable employment treatment on her entering a sexual relationship and threatened adverse consequences if she refused.
- Tomkins alleged Reppin physically restrained her when she tried to leave.
- Tomkins complained within the company and sought a transfer, ultimately accepting a less desirable position.
- About fifteen months later, PSE&G discharged her; she alleged the discharge was retaliation for refusing Reppin’s demands and complaining about his conduct.
- After receiving a right-to-sue letter, Tomkins filed a pro se Title VII action seeking damages and equitable relief; counsel later amended the complaint to name PSE&G and Reppin as defendants.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

## Issues

1. Whether allegations that a supervisor conditioned employment benefits on submission to sexual demands state discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII against the employer.
2. Whether an alleged retaliatory discharge tied to resisting and reporting the supervisor’s conduct states a Title VII retaliation claim where the underlying conduct is characterized as non-actionable under Title VII.
3. Whether Title VII permits employer liability for a supervisor’s alleged sexual advances treated as personal conduct rather than an employment practice.

## Decision

- The court granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
- The court held the alleged harassment and related employment consequences did not constitute sex discrimination actionable under Title VII.
- The court treated the alleged retaliation claim as failing for the same reason: without a cognizable Title VII discrimination violation, the related discharge allegation did not state a Title VII claim.

## Legal Principles

- Title VII addresses discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” not all workplace interpersonal misconduct.
- Conduct characterized as a supervisor’s individualized sexual pursuit, viewed as essentially personal and outside employment-related discrimination, was held not to constitute discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII.
- The court declined to read Title VII to impose broad vicarious liability on employers for a supervisor’s sexual conduct absent a clearer connection to an employment policy or sex-based classification.

## Conclusion

The district court dismissed Tomkins’s Title VII claims, concluding that the supervisor’s alleged sexual advances and the alleged discharge connected to resisting and reporting them were personal matters outside the statute’s prohibition on discrimination because of sex, and that recognizing such claims would extend employer liability beyond Title VII’s intended scope.


Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976)