## Facts

- The Town of Emerald Isle is a coastal municipality on Bogue Banks with Atlantic Ocean and Bogue Sound frontage.
- Private owners recorded subdivision plats for land near Bogue Inlet showing lots and streets, including Inlet Drive; recordation operated as an offer to dedicate the depicted streets to the Town and the public.
- The Town accepted Inlet Drive into its street system, maintained it, and received state street funds for it.
- After erosion eliminated part of the paved roadway, the Town obtained a state permit and built a vehicular ramp over dunes and accreted land at the west end of Inlet Drive to reach the beach.
- The General Assembly enacted Chapter 539 (1983), directing a state agency, in cooperation with the Town, to construct public pedestrian beach access facilities at the west end of Inlet Drive, restricting vehicular use of the ramp and adjacent area largely to emergency and public service vehicles, and assigning certain maintenance duties to the Town.
- The Town and related plaintiffs sued state officials, alleging the statute was unconstitutional as special/local legislation and as an improper infringement of municipal property and governance interests.

## Issues

1. Whether Chapter 539 is unconstitutional special or local legislation under the North Carolina Constitution because it applies to a single municipality and site.
2. Whether Chapter 539 violates the state constitutional ban on exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges.
3. Whether Chapter 539 violates the “law of the land” (due process) guarantee by depriving the Town of vested rights in its streets or effecting an uncompensated taking through use restrictions and maintenance obligations.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld Chapter 539 as constitutional.
- The court held the Act was a valid general law addressing a matter of statewide public welfare rather than an impermissible local act.
- The court held the vehicular restrictions and related duties were permissible regulations of public streets and beach access areas and did not amount to an unconstitutional taking or deprivation of municipal property without due process.
- The court rejected the claim that the Act conferred an unconstitutional exclusive privilege, characterizing the statute as serving public access, safety, and environmental purposes.
- The court recognized severability principles, concluding that any invalid portion (if present) could be severed without defeating the statute’s central policy.

## Legal Principles

- Whether legislation is “general” or “local” turns on substance and purpose; a statute directed at a single place may be treated as general if it serves a legitimate public purpose of statewide concern and operates on an appropriate class.
- Regulation of public streets and related public access is primarily a state legislative function; municipalities hold streets subject to the State’s paramount authority.
- Municipal receipt of state street funds and municipal maintenance of streets do not create vested rights immune from legislative regulation of street use.
- Legislative restrictions on the use of public streets and access facilities for safety, public welfare, and environmental protection are generally valid exercises of state power and do not, without more, constitute a compensable taking of municipal property.
- A statute expanding public access and regulating use for public purposes does not confer “exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges” merely because it allocates responsibilities between state and municipal government.

## Conclusion

The North Carolina Supreme Court sustained Chapter 539 as a constitutional exercise of legislative authority to provide pedestrian beach access and restrict vehicular traffic at Bogue Inlet, holding the statute was not impermissible local legislation and did not violate state constitutional provisions concerning special privileges or due process/property rights.


Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 360 S.E.2d 756 (N.C. 1987)