## Facts

- Paul Rumery was arrested and charged under New Hampshire law with felony witness tampering after a victim reported he tried to pressure her to drop charges against another defendant.
- Rumery, represented by counsel, negotiated a release-dismissal agreement with the prosecutor.
- Under the agreement, the prosecutor dismissed the witness-tampering charge in exchange for Rumery’s release of any claims against the town, its officials, and the victim arising from his arrest.
- Rumery signed the agreement three days after negotiation; the criminal charge was dismissed.
- About ten months later, Rumery sued the town and officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations including arrest without probable cause, false imprisonment, and defamation.
- The district court enforced the release and granted summary judgment for defendants; the First Circuit reversed under a per se rule barring such agreements.

## Issues

1. Whether a release-dismissal agreement waiving potential § 1983 claims in exchange for dismissal of criminal charges is per se unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
2. If not per se unenforceable, what standards govern enforceability, including voluntariness and the effect on relevant public interests.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit and held release-dismissal agreements are not per se invalid.
- Enforceability is governed by federal law informed by common-law public-policy principles, requiring case-specific assessment.
- A § 1983 waiver may be enforced if it is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent and if enforcement does not harm relevant public interests.
- A controlling concurrence emphasized that the government must show both voluntariness and that the agreement served a legitimate criminal-justice objective independent of avoiding civil liability.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these standards.

## Legal Principles

- The enforceability of waivers of federal civil-rights claims in release-dismissal agreements is a question of federal law, informed by common-law rules refusing enforcement when public-policy harms outweigh enforcement interests.
- Section 1983 does not categorically bar waivers; courts may enforce waivers of federal rights when voluntary and informed.
- Courts must reject categorical invalidation and instead scrutinize release-dismissal agreements case by case.
- Relevant voluntariness factors include representation by counsel, time for deliberation, defendant sophistication, and absence of prosecutorial overreaching.
- Enforcement also depends on public-interest compatibility, including whether the agreement served legitimate prosecutorial or criminal-justice interests rather than insulating official misconduct from accountability.

## Conclusion

Release-dismissal agreements that require a criminal defendant to waive potential § 1983 claims are not automatically void; they may be enforced when the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent and when the government shows enforcement is consistent with legitimate public interests rather than a means to suppress civil-rights accountability.


Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987)