## Facts

- The Directors Guild of America, Inc. (DGA) was the labor union and collective-bargaining agent for certain film-and-television positions, including production managers and unit production managers.
- DGA negotiated a collective-bargaining agreement (the “Basic Agreement”) with employers in the industry.
- The Basic Agreement required employers to use “qualification lists” in hiring for covered positions; the lists consisted of individuals eligible for hiring preference based on documented work experience.
- Individuals could apply to DGA Contract Administration (DGACA) to be placed on the relevant qualification list, and applicants bore the burden of submitting sufficient documentation of qualifying experience.
- A person could be included on a qualification list without being a DGA member.
- Marvin George Towns, Jr. was a DGA member who worked on a television production in Georgia (the series *The Haves & Have Nots*) as a production manager/unit production manager.
- DGA informed the production’s employer (And Action, LLC) that Towns was not on the applicable geographic qualification list and that employing him in that position did not satisfy the Basic Agreement’s hiring requirements.
- The employer told Towns he could remain in the position only if he provided documentation establishing he qualified for placement on the list.
- Towns did not provide documentation that resulted in his placement on the qualification list, and the employer terminated his employment.
- Towns sued DGA asserting (1) a claim under Georgia’s right-to-work statute, arguing the qualification list functioned as a “labor organization” he was required to “join” to keep his job, and (2) multiple state-law tort claims, including tortious interference theories, based on DGA’s involvement in his termination.
- DGA moved to dismiss, arguing Towns was not required to join any labor organization and that the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) § 301 preempted the state-law tort claims because they depended on the Basic Agreement.
- The district court granted DGA’s motion and dismissed Towns’s claims against DGA.
- On appeal, Towns attempted to argue for the first time that DGACA (rather than the qualification list) was the “labor organization” under Georgia’s right-to-work law.

## Issues

1. Whether Towns plausibly stated a claim under Georgia’s right-to-work law by alleging he was required to “join” the qualification list as a condition of employment.
2. Whether Towns could argue for the first time on appeal that DGACA was the relevant “labor organization” for his Georgia right-to-work theory.
3. Whether Towns’s state-law tort claims against DGA were preempted by LMRA § 301 because resolving them would require construing the Basic Agreement’s qualification-list and hiring provisions.

## Decision

- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the Georgia right-to-work claim because Towns’s complaint did not plausibly allege that his employment was conditioned on membership in a “labor organization” within the meaning of Georgia law.
- The court declined to consider Towns’s new appellate theory that DGACA was the labor organization because the argument was not raised in the district court and was forfeited on appeal.
- The court affirmed dismissal of Towns’s state-law tort claims as preempted by LMRA § 301 because determining liability would require interpretation of the Basic Agreement’s qualification-list requirements and related hiring rules.
- The judgment dismissing Towns’s claims against DGA was affirmed.

## Legal Principles

- Georgia’s right-to-work statute prohibits requiring an individual to join or remain a member of a labor organization as a condition of employment; a plaintiff must plead facts showing such a membership condition.
- A qualification-list system based on documented experience, where list placement is available without union membership, does not by itself establish compelled union membership.
- An argument or theory not presented to the district court is generally forfeited and will not be considered for the first time on appeal.
- LMRA § 301 preempts state-law causes of action when their resolution is substantially dependent on analysis or interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.
- State-law tort claims premised on a union’s enforcement or application of collectively bargained hiring/eligibility rules are preempted when the court would need to determine what the CBA required and whether the union acted consistently with it.

## Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Towns’s suit against DGA because his right-to-work allegations did not plausibly show that continued employment depended on joining a labor organization, his new DGACA-based theory was raised too late, and his state tort claims were barred by LMRA § 301 since deciding them would require construing the Basic Agreement’s qualification-list provisions.


Towns v. Directors Guild of America, 2022 WL 169017 (2002)