## Facts

- Clem Boyd executed a will creating scholarship funds for students at Georgia Institute of Technology and two private universities.
- The scholarships were limited to “poor white boys and girls.”
- Trustees were directed to use trust income for scholarships and had discretion to prefer descendants of Boyd’s parents, including limited principal payments for college expenses.
- The will contained no general gift-over or reverter clause for failure of the scholarship trust, though other will provisions included alternative-gift language.
- The executor sought judicial construction of the will and direction on administration issues, including the scholarship trust, a beneficiary’s conditional renunciation, and the executor’s power to sell real property.
- Because Georgia Tech is a public institution, state involvement was conceded, making the racial restriction unenforceable under the Fourteenth Amendment.
- The trial court applied cy pres to preserve the scholarship trust by severing the racial restriction, granted summary judgment to appellees on several construction issues, and left to a jury whether a beneficiary’s conditional renunciation had become operative.

## Issues

1. Whether an order denying the executor’s summary-judgment motion but granting summary judgment to appellees on multiple issues was directly appealable.
2. Whether a beneficiary’s “conditional renunciation” was invalid as a matter of law or instead presented a factual question about whether its conditions occurred.
3. Whether a scholarship trust limiting awards to “poor white boys and girls” could be enforced when a public university was involved in its administration.
4. Whether, after the racial restriction was voided, the scholarship trust failed (causing reversion to heirs) or could be saved by cy pres to carry out a general charitable intent.
5. Whether the trial court correctly construed other will provisions, including the executor’s authority to sell real property.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Georgia held the order was appealable because it granted summary judgment to appellees on substantial issues even though it also denied the executor’s motion.
- The Court affirmed denial of summary judgment on the conditional renunciation because its operation depended on a factual determination properly left for a jury.
- The Court held the racial restriction was unconstitutional and unenforceable due to state action connected to Georgia Tech.
- The Court affirmed application of cy pres, striking the racial limitation and allowing the scholarship trust to operate on a race-neutral basis rather than reverting to heirs.
- The Court affirmed the trial court’s remaining will-construction rulings, including those concerning the executor’s power of sale.

## Legal Principles

- An order that grants summary judgment on material issues is directly appealable even if it also denies the opposing party’s motion for summary judgment.
- A renunciation conditioned on future events is not facially invalid solely because it is conditional; if effectiveness depends on disputed facts, the issue is for the factfinder.
- When administration of a charitable trust involves sufficient state participation through a public institution, racially restrictive terms violate the Equal Protection Clause and are void.
- Cy pres permits modification of an unlawful charitable-trust condition to effectuate the testator’s general charitable intent when the illegal limitation is incidental to the broader purpose.
- In construing a will, provisions are read to implement the overall testamentary plan, and courts may construe administrative powers (such as a power of sale) to support execution of that plan.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed construction of a testamentary scholarship trust by severing an unconstitutional racial restriction and applying cy pres to preserve the donor’s general educational charity, while also upholding appealability of the partial summary-judgment order and leaving the conditional-renunciation question to a jury.


Trammell v. Elliott, 230 Ga. 841, 199 S.E.2d 194 (Ga. 1973)