## Facts

- John K. Lincoln, Jr., G. Daniel Kearley, and Danny L. Traweek each owned lots in the Funderburg Cove Subdivision in St. Clair County, Alabama.
- The subdivision was subject to restrictive covenants recorded in 1964.
- The covenants stated that most lots were “residential lots” and limited structures on “residential building lot[s]” to a single-family dwelling and related outbuildings, and limited use of buildings on those lots to residential purposes.
- The covenants also contained an exception for specified lots, including Lot 21, providing those lots “may be used as business or residential lots,” and that “[i]f used as residential lots, they shall be subject to the same restrictions as other residential lots.”
- Before June 17, 2005, Traweek placed a mobile home on Lot 21. The mobile home was approximately 1,280 square feet and had a composite-type roof.
- Traweek used the mobile home for business purposes.
- Lincoln and Kearley sued Traweek for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that placing the mobile home on Lot 21 violated the restrictive covenants and requesting an order requiring removal.
- At trial, a developer testified that he did not intend the covenants to allow mobile homes on subdivision lots. The trial court concluded that the covenants impliedly prohibited mobile homes and entered an injunction requiring Traweek to remove the mobile home.
- Traweek appealed. Because the material facts were essentially undisputed and the dispute turned on interpretation of a written instrument, the appellate court reviewed the legal questions without deference to the trial court’s interpretation.

## Issues

1. Whether the restrictive covenants clearly and unambiguously prohibited Traweek from placing a mobile home on Lot 21.
2. Whether the trial court erred by relying on extrinsic testimony about the developer’s intent to read an unstated prohibition on mobile homes into the covenants.

## Decision

- The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Traweek.
- The court held that the covenants did not clearly and unambiguously prohibit mobile homes, and any doubt had to be resolved against imposing the restriction.
- The court rejected the trial court’s use of developer testimony to supply a mobile-home prohibition not stated in the recorded covenants.

## Legal Principles

- Restrictive covenants are disfavored and are strictly construed; doubts and ambiguities are resolved against the restriction and in favor of free use of land.
- A restriction will be enforced only when the intent to restrict is clear from the covenant’s language; courts do not add limits that are not expressed in the recorded instrument.
- Extrinsic evidence of a developer’s unstated intent cannot be used to create or expand a restriction where the covenant text does not clearly impose it.
- When the material facts are not in dispute and the issue is interpretation of a written covenant, appellate review is de novo.

## Conclusion

Because the recorded covenants did not expressly bar mobile homes and did not clearly impose such a ban by their terms, the trial court improperly extended the restrictions by treating mobile homes as prohibited based on testimony about subjective developer intent. The appellate court therefore reversed the injunction requiring removal of Traweek’s mobile home and ordered entry of judgment for Traweek.


Traweek v. Lincoln, 984 So. 2d 439 (2007)