## Facts

- Ronnie Traylor and a friend, Dierking, were splitting logs using two mauls; Dierking’s maul was manufactured and distributed by Husqvarna Motor (referred to as Omark).
- Each maul was sold with warnings not to strike one maul against another (risk of chipping and eye injury) and not to use a maul without safety goggles.
- Traylor’s maul became stuck in a log. Traylor, not wearing eye protection, crouched near the embedded head and steadied the handle.
- Dierking struck Traylor’s maul with the flat surface of his Omark maul; the Omark maul chipped, and the chip entered Traylor’s eye, causing loss of the eye.
- There was evidence Dierking had observed the Omark maul’s striking surface was chipped, cracked, and misshapen before the accident.
- Plaintiffs presented evidence suggesting the Omark maul was defectively designed or manufactured, including an unusually narrow bevel and uneven steel hardness that increased the likelihood of chipping when struck.

## Issues

1. Under Indiana products-liability law, does the “incurred risk” (assumption of risk) defense require the plaintiff’s actual knowledge of the specific defect or defect-created risk that caused the injury, rather than mere awareness of a general danger?
2. Did the trial court err by instructing the jury that Traylor could be found to have incurred the risk based on knowing the dangers of striking mauls together or not wearing goggles, without requiring knowledge of the defect in Dierking’s maul?

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment for Omark and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held the jury instructions misstated Indiana incurred-risk law by allowing the defense without requiring proof that Traylor actually knew of the defect (or the specific risk arising from it).
- The instructional error was not harmless because incurred risk, if found, could completely bar recovery under Indiana law as applied in this case.

## Legal Principles

- Under Indiana law, “incurred risk” in a products-liability case is a subjective doctrine requiring proof that the plaintiff actually knew and appreciated the specific risk that materialized and nevertheless voluntarily encountered it.
- Knowledge that product use is generally dangerous, or that a warned-against practice can cause injury, is insufficient if the alleged basis of liability is a defect that creates a heightened or different risk.
- Jury instructions on incurred risk must require findings tied to the plaintiff’s awareness of the particular defect or defect-created danger; instructions permitting a general-danger standard misstate the defense.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit ordered a new trial because the jury was permitted to find incurred risk based on Traylor’s general awareness that striking mauls together and foregoing eye protection can be dangerous, even absent proof he knew of the specific defective condition alleged to have caused the chipping injury.


Traylor v. Husqvarna Motor, 988 F.2d 729 (7th Cir. 1993)