## Facts

- The President of the Republic and the Prime Minister referred the Treaty of Amsterdam to the French Constitutional Council for preventive constitutional review under Article 54 of the 1958 Constitution.
- The Treaty of Amsterdam (signed Oct. 2, 1997) amended the Treaty on European Union and the European Community treaties, including reforms to competences and decision-making.
- The treaty expanded Union/Community action in areas including visas, asylum, immigration, border controls, and aspects of justice and home affairs, including greater use of qualified majority voting and judicial review at the EU level.
- France’s Constitution (Title XV) already authorized participation in the European Communities and the European Union, including certain transfers of competences, but subject to limits tied to national sovereignty.
- The Council assessed whether new treaty commitments altered the “essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty” beyond what the existing Constitution permitted.

## Issues

1. Whether provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam were contrary to the Constitution by affecting the essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty.
2. If any provisions were unconstitutional, whether Article 54 required a constitutional revision before France could authorize ratification.
3. Whether the treaty’s expansions of EU competence and institutional decision-making (including in border/immigration and criminal justice cooperation) exceeded the authorization already contained in Title XV.

## Decision

- The Council found the treaty only partially compatible with the Constitution.
- It held that authorization to ratify could not be given unless the Constitution was revised beforehand, as required by Article 54 when an international commitment contains unconstitutional clauses.
- The Council concluded that certain new transfers of competence—especially in visas, asylum, immigration, external border controls, and aspects of criminal justice cooperation—affected essential conditions of national sovereignty.
- The ruling did not invalidate the treaty; it conditioned domestic authorization to ratify on prior constitutional amendment.

## Legal Principles

- Under Article 54, if an international commitment contains a clause contrary to the Constitution, ratification/approval may occur only after constitutional revision.
- The Constitution remains supreme in domestic law; European integration commitments are permitted only within constitutional limits.
- Transfers of competence to European institutions are constitutionally permissible in principle, but not where they undermine the essential conditions for exercising national sovereignty.
- Areas closely tied to core state powers—such as control of borders, immigration policy, and aspects of criminal law enforcement—can require explicit constitutional authorization when commitments materially constrain national decision-making.
- Institutional changes expanding binding EU decision-making must preserve constitutionally required democratic control by national authorities over commitments undertaken within the European framework.

## Conclusion

The French Constitutional Council determined that parts of the Treaty of Amsterdam would affect essential conditions of national sovereignty beyond existing constitutional authorization, so France could authorize ratification only after first amending the Constitution pursuant to Article 54.


Treaty of Amsterdam (Fr. Const. Council) (Dec. 31, 1997)