## Facts

- Tri-County Concrete Company acquired property in North Royalton, Ohio to expand its concrete operations.
- The City granted Tri-County a use variance to construct facilities on the property, but the variance was subject to restrictions; noncompliance could lead to revocation.
- North Royalton determined Tri-County violated the variance restrictions and posted stop-work orders on the site on July 2, 1996.
- Tri-County attempted to continue operations the next day despite the stop-work orders.
- On July 9, 1996, the City issued an order directing Tri-County to correct the violations within 15 days.
- Lisa Uffman-Kirsch participated in a local citizens’ organization supporting an initiative to establish a rural-residential zoning district in North Royalton.
- On July 22, 1996, Uffman-Kirsch sent a letter to the North Royalton Planning Commission describing Tri-County’s conduct as “total disregard” and “complete defiance” of the City’s laws, restrictions, and requirements.
- On September 18, 1996, Tri-County sued Uffman-Kirsch (and others), asserting claims for defamation (libel) and “malicious interference” with Tri-County’s constitutional right to petition the government for redress of grievances.
- Uffman-Kirsch counterclaimed against Tri-County for abuse of process and violation of her First Amendment free-speech rights, characterizing the lawsuit as a SLAPP-type action.
- The trial court granted summary judgment to Uffman-Kirsch on Tri-County’s claims and granted summary judgment to Tri-County on Uffman-Kirsch’s counterclaims; both parties appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether statements in Uffman-Kirsch’s letter to the Planning Commission were actionable defamatory statements of fact or protected opinion/rhetorical characterizations in a public zoning dispute, including whether Tri-County showed a triable issue on falsity.
2. Whether Ohio recognizes a tort claim for “malicious interference” with another party’s constitutional right to petition the government, and, if so, whether Tri-County produced evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment.
3. Whether Tri-County’s filing and prosecution of the lawsuit supported Uffman-Kirsch’s counterclaim for abuse of process.
4. Whether, absent an Ohio anti-SLAPP statute, Uffman-Kirsch could recover damages on a counterclaim framed as a violation of her First Amendment speech rights based solely on being sued.

## Decision

- The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Uffman-Kirsch on Tri-County’s claims.
- The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Tri-County on Uffman-Kirsch’s counterclaims.
- As to defamation, the court concluded Tri-County failed to show a genuine issue of material fact that the challenged statements were actionable false statements of fact rather than nonactionable opinion/characterization in the context of citizen communications to government officials about alleged noncompliance.
- As to Tri-County’s “malicious interference with the right to petition” theory, the court upheld summary judgment for Uffman-Kirsch because the claim was not established as a viable, evidence-supported cause of action on these facts.
- As to abuse of process, the court upheld summary judgment for Tri-County because the record did not show a misuse of legal process after the case was initiated.
- As to the First Amendment/SLAPP theory, the court declined to treat the act of filing the lawsuit as an independent constitutional tort supporting damages, noting that Ohio lacked anti-SLAPP legislation (though Ohio had a general statute addressing frivolous conduct).

## Legal Principles

- Defamation requires an actionable statement of fact; courts evaluate context to distinguish verifiable assertions from opinion, rhetorical language, and value-laden characterizations made during public disputes presented to government bodies.
- Truth or substantial truth defeats defamation; a plaintiff opposing summary judgment must identify evidence creating a genuine dispute as to falsity and actionable meaning.
- A court will not infer or create a new tort for interference with constitutional petition rights without clear authority; protected citizen participation before governmental bodies is not wrongful conduct simply because it is adverse to a private party’s interests.
- Abuse of process requires more than an allegedly improper motive for filing suit; it requires evidence that process, once issued, was used to accomplish an end outside the scope of the proceeding.
- In the absence of an anti-SLAPP statute, a party generally cannot convert the filing of a civil action into a stand-alone damages claim for an alleged violation of free-speech rights; procedural devices and existing statutory remedies for frivolous litigation are the usual tools.

## Conclusion

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment on all claims and counterclaims, holding that Tri-County failed to show a triable defamation claim arising from Uffman-Kirsch’s citizen letter to the Planning Commission and failed to support a claim for “malicious interference” with petition rights, while Uffman-Kirsch likewise failed to show abuse of process or a free-speech damages theory based on being sued in a state without anti-SLAPP legislation.


Tri-County Concrete Co. v. Uffman-Kirsch, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4749 (2000)