## Facts

- Vipin Trivedi, of East Indian national origin, worked as a scientific researcher for the New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) from about 1982 to 1995.
- Thomas Cooper supervised Trivedi during much of that period.
- Trivedi sued Cooper in federal court in 1995, asserting employment-discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and New York Executive Law § 296.
- Trivedi claimed Cooper (1) created a hostile work environment through harassment tied to Trivedi’s national origin, including alleged repeated racial slurs; (2) blocked Trivedi’s career advancement by refusing to support or sponsor him; and (3) retaliated after learning Trivedi sought legal help to assert his rights, including by issuing a negative evaluation.
- Cooper denied making racial remarks, denied discriminating, and disputed the account of blocked advancement, testifying that Trivedi could pursue advancement through other channels and that Cooper was not asked to provide support.
- Cooper also introduced evidence that Trivedi behaved oddly and suffered from mental illness, including episodes during counseling sessions where Trivedi taped his mouth shut or attempted not to hear by stuffing his ears, and displayed unusual signs.
- Cooper presented testimony from two psychiatric experts diagnosing Trivedi with a delusional disorder with manifestations of paranoid schizophrenia. Trivedi did not present psychiatric expert testimony in response.
- Trivedi’s proof of emotional harm relied largely on his own testimony (for example, that he felt insulted and sad).
- Before trial, claims against OMH were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, leaving Cooper as the defendant.
- At the close of Trivedi’s case-in-chief, Cooper moved for a directed verdict (Rule 50(a)) on the retaliation and career-advancement claims; the court denied the motion and sent all claims to the jury.
- The jury found for Trivedi on all theories and awarded $700,000 for pain and suffering on the hostile-environment theory, back pay on the career-advancement theory, and $1 in nominal damages on the retaliation theory.
- Cooper then moved post-trial for judgment as a matter of law (Rule 50(b)) or, alternatively, a new trial (Rule 59) and remittitur of the emotional-distress award.

## Issues

1. Whether Cooper was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) on the hostile-environment, career-advancement, and retaliation theories.
2. Whether a new trial should be granted under Rule 59 because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence or seriously erroneous.
3. Whether the $700,000 emotional-distress award was excessive and, if so, whether the proper remedy was remittitur with a conditional new trial if Trivedi rejected the reduced amount.

## Decision

- The court denied Cooper’s renewed Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on all three theories.
- The court denied Cooper’s request for a new trial as to liability under Rule 59.
- The court granted remittitur, holding the $700,000 pain-and-suffering award for the hostile-environment theory was excessive on this record.
- The court reduced the award to the highest amount it concluded would not be excessive and ordered that, if Trivedi did not accept the reduced award, a new trial would be held on the hostile-environment claim (including liability and damages).

## Legal Principles

- A Rule 50(b) motion is a renewal of a Rule 50(a) motion; the movant must have made a Rule 50(a) motion at trial to seek post-verdict judgment as a matter of law, and the post-verdict motion is generally limited to grounds raised in the earlier motion.
- In deciding Rule 50(b), the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner and does not weigh witness credibility; judgment is proper only if no reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant.
- Under Rule 59, a court may order a new trial when the verdict is against the weight of the evidence or is seriously erroneous, but the court gives substantial deference to the jury’s role in resolving conflicts in testimony.
- When a jury’s damages award is excessive, the court may order remittitur by reducing the award to the highest amount that would not be excessive and giving the plaintiff a choice between accepting that amount or proceeding to a new trial.
- In a federal civil-rights action, federal standards govern review of the excessiveness of a compensatory damages award and the use of remittitur.

## Conclusion

After a jury found Cooper liable for a hostile work environment, interference with Trivedi’s career advancement, and retaliation, the court rejected Cooper’s post-verdict efforts to overturn the liability findings under Rules 50(b) and 59, but ruled that the $700,000 emotional-distress award was unsupported by the evidence presented and therefore excessive, ordering remittitur to the maximum sustainable amount with a new trial on the hostile-environment claim if Trivedi refused the reduction.


Trivedi v. Cooper, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18715 (1996)